Class 12 History Chapter 9 Colonialism and the Countryside Short Notes in English

A last-minute revision squeeze of this chapter: the Permanent Settlement and the zamindars of Bengal, the Paharias and Santhals of the Rajmahal hills, the Bombay Deccan’s cotton boom and the 1875 riots, and how historians read official archives such as the Fifth Report and the Deccan Riots Commission Report. The full explained notes are available separately.

1 The whole chapter in one frame

Colonialism and the Countryside (1793-1878)
Bengal and the zamindarsPermanent Settlement, defaults, fictitious auctions
The hoe and the ploughPaharias, Santhals and the Rajmahal hills
The Bombay DeccanRyotwari, cotton boom, the 1875 revolt

The single most important line in this chapter: historians reconstruct rural India’s colonial history mainly from official archives, revenue records, survey journals, and enquiry-commission reports, and every one of them carries the bias of the official who wrote it. The Fifth Report and the Deccan Riots Commission Report are both invaluable and both need reading critically, against newspapers, petitions and, where possible, oral sources.

2 Definitions worth memorising

Every definition in one place
Permanent Settlement1793 Bengal revenue system: demand fixed forever with rajas/taluqdars, reclassified as zamindars.
Sunset LawA zamindari was liable to auction if payment did not arrive by sunset of the due date.
BenamiA transaction made in the name of a fictitious or insignificant person while the real beneficiary stays unnamed.
JotedarA rich, resident Bengal peasant with more day-to-day village power than an absentee zamindar.
Adhiyar / bargadarA sharecropper: brings own plough and labour, keeps half the harvest.
Haoladar / gantidarOther regional names for a jotedar-like rich peasant, outside North Bengal.
DikuThe Santhals’ word for the high-interest moneylenders who seized their land.
Damin-i-KohTerritory demarcated in 1832 in the Rajmahal hills as Santhal land.
Ryotwari settlementBombay Deccan revenue system: fixed directly with the ryot, resurveyed every 30 years, never permanent.
Deed of hireA peasant’s own animals, sold to a moneylender to clear debt, hired back for a monthly fee.
Limitation Law (1859)Made loan bonds valid 3 years; moneylenders used it to force fresh, compounding bonds instead.
Lathyal / cutcherry / proja / sahukarA zamindar’s armed strongman; his court; a loyal ryot-subject; a moneylender-trader.

3 Bengal: the Permanent Settlement, at a glance

1793Permanent Settlement fixes Bengal’s revenue demand forever
75%+of Bengal zamindaris changed hands after the Settlement
30,000+pending rent-arrear suits in Burdwan alone, 1798

Why zamindars defaulted

  • Demand pegged too high from the very start
  • Imposed in the 1790s, a time of depressed prices
  • Revenue invariable regardless of harvest (Sunset Law)
  • Zamindars’ own troops, courts, customs power stripped away

How zamindars survived anyway

  • Fictitious sale: property moved to a female relative first
  • Benami purchases: agents bought back the estate, refused payment, forced resale
  • Rs 30 lakh in benami purchases, 4 zamindaris, 1793-1801
  • Lathyals and loyal ryots (proja) resisted outside buyers

4 The Fifth Report (1813)

1813submitted to the British Parliament
1,002pages, 800+ of them appendices
150+ yrsit shaped historians’ picture of rural Bengal

Produced by a Select Committee amid British debate over the East India Company’s trade monopoly and misrule. Exaggerated zamindari collapse and overstated land loss, since fictitious sales show many zamindars kept real control. Invaluable evidence, but not a neutral record.

5 Rajmahal hills: Paharias vs Santhals

Paharias: the hoe

  • Forest-dependent, shifting cultivation (hoe, burn, ash-enriched soil)
  • Mahua, silk cocoons, resin, charcoal; raided the plains for tribute/tolls
  • Resisted extermination (1770s) and Cleveland’s pacification (1780s)
  • Pushed into the barren upper hills once the Damin took the fertile lower slopes

Santhals: the plough

  • Cleared forest, ploughed for rice and cotton from c. 1800
  • Damin-i-Koh demarcated 1832; villages 40→1,473, population 3,000→82,000+ (1838-51)
  • New crisis: heavy state taxes, diku moneylenders, zamindar claims into the Damin
  • Santhal Revolt 1855-56 (led by Sidhu Manjhi) → Santhal Pargana carved out (5,500 sq mi)
Two kinds of colonial source

Buchanan’s survey journal is rich but was funded by the Company for its own commercial-resource needs, so he judged land by how “productive” it could be made, not by how the Paharias themselves valued it. William Hodges’ 1782 paintings show the same hills officials called dangerous as exotic and idyllic, because he was painting in the Romantic “picturesque” style, not recording a neutral view. Both are sources that need to be read for what they were made to do, not taken as plain fact.

6 The Bombay Deccan: ryotwari and the cotton boom

1818first Deccan revenue settlement
1832-34famine kills 1/3 of cattle, half the population
2×Deccan cotton acreage, 1860-1864
90%+of Britain’s cotton imports from India by 1862

Ryotwari fixed revenue directly with the ryot (David Ricardo’s “average rent” idea), resurveyed every 30 years, never permanent, unlike Bengal. The 1861 American Civil War cut US cotton exports to Britain, triggering an Indian cotton boom on easy credit; its 1865 collapse, plus a 50-100% revenue rise, left ryots in deeper debt than ever.

7 Why the ryots burned the books

Not simple indebtedness, moneylending long predated colonial rule, but moneylenders breaking the old rule that interest could never exceed the principal (one case: Rs 2,000+ interest on a Rs 100 loan). Deeds of hire made peasants pay to use their own bullocks; the 1859 Limitation Law was turned into a tool for compounding interest via a fresh bond every three years. On 12 May 1875 ryots at Supa (Poona district) attacked sahukars and burned bahi khatas and bonds; 951 arrested before order was restored.

Common Mistake

Do not say the Deccan Riots Commission (1878) blamed the government’s revenue policy. It specifically concluded that it was the moneylenders who were to blame, a recurring colonial-records pattern of avoiding blame for the state’s own actions.

8 Timeline

1765East India Company acquires the Diwani of Bengal
1773Regulating Act passed by the British Parliament
1793Permanent Settlement in Bengal
1800sSanthals begin to settle in the Rajmahal hills
1818First revenue settlement in the Bombay Deccan
1820sAgricultural prices begin to fall
1840s-50sSlow agrarian expansion in the Bombay Deccan
1855-56Santhal rebellion
1861Cotton boom begins
1875Ryots in Deccan villages rebel
Quick Revision · read this the night before the exam
  • Permanent Settlement (1793): revenue fixed forever, pegged too high, at a time of falling prices, with no flexibility → most zamindars defaulted, but survived via fictitious sale and benami purchases.
  • Jotedars, resident rich peasants, held more real day-to-day power in the village than absentee zamindars.
  • The Fifth Report (1813) shaped historians’ view of Bengal for 150+ years but exaggerated zamindari collapse to build a case against the Company.
  • Paharias (hoe, shifting cultivation) vs Santhals (plough, settled cultivation): Damin-i-Koh (1832) gave the Santhals land but pushed the Paharias into the poorer upper hills.
  • Santhal debt to dikus and zamindar claims into the Damin led to the 1855-56 rebellion (Sidhu Manjhi) and the creation of the Santhal Pargana.
  • Buchanan’s surveys are detailed but shaped by Company commercial priorities, not a neutral outsider’s record.
  • Ryotwari settlement (Bombay Deccan): fixed directly with the ryot, resurveyed every 30 years, unlike Bengal’s permanent demand.
  • The 1861 cotton boom (American Civil War) brought easy credit and expanded cultivation; its 1865 collapse, plus a revenue demand raised by 50 to 100 per cent, led to the 1875 Deccan riots.
  • Ryots burned account books because moneylenders broke the norm that interest could never exceed the principal, not simply because they were in debt.
  • The Deccan Riots Commission (1878) blamed the moneylenders, not the revenue demand, a pattern of colonial reports avoiding blame for the state’s own revenue policy.