Class 12 Political Science Book 2 Chapter 4 India’s External Relations NCERT Solutions

Q. Write ‘true’ or ‘false’ against each of these statements.
(a) Non-alignment allowed India to gain assistance both from USA and USSR.
(b) India’s relationship with her neighbours has been strained from the beginning.
(c) The cold war has affected the relationship between India and Pakistan.
(d) The treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1971 was the result of India’s closeness to USA.

Answers: (a) True    (b) False    (c) True    (d) False

(a) True. The chapter says it directly: “by and large India did take an independent
stand on various international issues and could get aid and assistance from members of both the
blocs”. Being in neither camp meant neither camp could write India off.

(b) False. The strain was not there from the beginning, at least not with every neighbour.
“Unlike its relationship with Pakistan, free India began its relationship with China on a very
friendly note.” India was one of the first countries to recognise the communist government after
the Chinese revolution of 1949, leaders visited each other’s countries and were greeted by large
and friendly crowds, and the Chinese border was for a very long time guarded by para-military forces,
not the army. With Pakistan too there was real cooperation alongside the conflict: the two governments
worked together to restore the women abducted during partition, and signed the Indus Waters Treaty in
1960.

(c) True. Pakistan joined the US-led military alliances while India advocated non-alignment,
and “Pakistan soon emerged as a critical factor in India’s relations with the US and
subsequently with China”. In 1971, US and Chinese support for Pakistan pushed India towards the
Soviet Union. The bloc rivalry of the Cold War therefore ran straight through the India-Pakistan
relationship.

(d) False. It was the result of the opposite. “In order to counter the
US-Pakistan-China axis, India signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in
August 1971.” The treaty was a response to India’s distance from the US, not to any
closeness to it.

Q. Match the following
(a) The goal of India’s foreign policy in the period 1950-1964
(b) Panchsheel
(c) Bandung Conference
(d) Dalai Lama
(i) Tibetan spiritual leader who crossed over to India
(ii) Preservation of territorial integrity, sovereignty and economic development
(iii) Five principles of peaceful coexistence
(iv) Led to the establishment of NAM

Answers: (a) is (ii)    (b) is (iii)    (c) is (iv)
   (d) is (i)

• (a) pairs with (ii). “The three major objectives of Nehru’s foreign policy were
  to preserve the hard-earned sovereignty, protect territorial integrity, and promote rapid economic
  development.” Nehru was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister through this period.
• (b) pairs with (iii). “The joint enunciation of Panchsheel, the Five Principles of
  Peaceful Coexistence, by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on
  29 April 1954…”
• (c) pairs with (iv). “The Bandung Conference later led to the establishment of the
  NAM.” The conference itself was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955.
• (d) pairs with (i). “in 1959, the Dalai Lama crossed over into the Indian border and
  sought asylum which was granted.” He is described throughout as the Tibetan spiritual
  leader.

Careful. Item (ii) names three things, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
economic development, and item (iii) names five principles. Do not let the numbers pull you into
pairing (b) with (ii).

Q. Why did Nehru regard conduct of foreign relations as an essential indicator of
independence? State any two reasons with examples to support your reading.

Answer. The starting point is Nehru’s own sentence, spoken during a debate in the
Constituent Assembly in March 1949 and printed in the margin of this chapter:

“What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign
relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy. Once foreign relations go out
of your hands into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not
independent.”

Reason 1: a country that cannot decide its own external policy is only self-governing, not
independent. Nehru’s own test is that the moment foreign relations pass into somebody
else’s charge, you are not independent to that extent. Everything else, however important, is
what he calls local autonomy, which a colony can also be granted.

Example. India refused to join either bloc. When the US-led NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw
Pact came into existence, India kept away from both and advocated non-alignment as the ideal foreign
policy approach, even though the US was not happy about it and there was considerable unease in
Indo-US relations during the 1950s. Taking a stand that annoyed a superpower was itself the proof of
independence.

Reason 2: only a state that decides for itself can serve its own national interest. A
developing country that follows whoever gives it aid or credits has surrendered its foreign policy
with its choices. Nehru’s three objectives, preserving sovereignty, protecting territorial
integrity and promoting rapid economic development, could only be pursued by a state that chose its
own friends.

Example. India took opposite positions in the same year, 1956, judging each case on its own
merits: it led the world protest when Britain attacked Egypt over the Suez Canal, and it did not join
the public condemnation when the USSR invaded Hungary. Neither position was dictated from outside, and
because India stayed independent in this way it could still get aid and assistance from members of both
blocs.

Q. “The conduct of foreign affairs is an outcome of a two-way interaction between
domestic compulsions and prevailing international climate”. Take one example from India’s
external relations in the 1960s to substantiate your answer.

Answer. The chapter itself makes this point at the start: just as both internal and external
factors guide the behaviour of an individual or a family, both the domestic and the international
environment influence the foreign policy of a nation.

The example: the war with China in October 1962.

The international climate that produced it. China had taken control of Tibet in 1950 and
removed a historical buffer between the two countries. A boundary dispute then surfaced, with India
claiming the boundary was a matter settled in colonial time and China saying that no colonial decision
applied. Between 1957 and 1959 the Chinese occupied Aksai-chin and built a strategic road there. When
the invasion came in October 1962, the entire world’s attention was on the Cuban Missile crisis
involving the two superpowers. India
had to approach the Americans and the British for military assistance, and the Soviet Union remained
neutral.

The domestic compulsions it produced in turn. The war dented India’s image at home and
abroad. It induced a sense of national humiliation and at the same time strengthened a spirit of
nationalism. Some top army commanders resigned or were retired, Defence Minister V. Krishna Menon had
to leave the cabinet, and Nehru was severely criticised for his naive assessment of Chinese intentions
and the lack of military preparedness. For the first time a no-confidence motion against his
government was moved and debated in the Lok Sabha, and the Congress lost some key by-elections. The
Communist Party of India, pulled apart by the conflict and by the growing rift between China and the
Soviet Union, split in 1964. The war also pushed the government into a military modernisation drive
that derailed the five-year plans.

The two-way interaction. An external event reshaped domestic politics, and that changed
domestic politics then reshaped external policy: defence spending rose enormously, new departments
were created in November 1962 and November 1965, and the government could no longer treat the
neighbourhood as safe.

An equally good example. The 1971 treaty with the Soviet Union works just as
well: about 80 lakh refugees was the domestic compulsion, and the US-Pakistan-China axis was the
international climate. Use one example, not three, and develop it fully.

Q. Identify any two aspects of India’s foreign policy that you would like to retain and
two that you would like to change, if you were to become a decision maker. Give reasons to support your
position.

Answer. This question asks for a position, so state it clearly and defend it from the
chapter. One well-supported set of choices follows; another set is equally acceptable if the reasons
are as clear.

Two aspects to retain.

• An independent judgement on each international issue. This is what let India lead the
  world protest against the attack on Egypt in 1956 and still receive aid and assistance from members
  of both blocs. A country that decides case by case keeps more friends and fewer obligations than one
  that has signed up to a camp.
• Solidarity with the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. The Asian Relations
  Conference of March 1947, the 1949 conference for Indonesia’s freedom, the opposition to
  racism and to apartheid in South Africa, and Bandung in 1955 gave India a standing that its material
  strength could not have bought. As C. Rajagopalachari wrote in 1950, a country without material, men
  or money was being recognised as a moral power.

Two aspects to change.

• The gap between the principle and the preparation. India followed peace as a principle but
  was not ready for the attack of 1962; the criticism of the lack of military preparedness is the
  chapter’s own. Good relations should not have replaced adequate defence, and after 1962 the
  country had to pay for both at once, diverting scarce resources from the plans.
• The reading of a neighbour’s intentions from goodwill alone. Nehru thought a Chinese
  attack “exceedingly unlikely” while Vallabhbhai Patel was worried about it, and the
  border was guarded by para-military forces rather than the army. A foreign policy should be built on
  a hard reading of interests, not on friendly crowds.

Write it as a decision-maker, not as a critic. For each of the four, say what you
would do and what the chapter shows would follow from it. Two retained plus two changed, four reasons,
four examples.

Q. Write short notes on the following.
(a) India’s Nuclear policy
(b) Consensus in foreign policy matters

(a) India’s Nuclear policy.

• Origin. Nehru had always put his faith in science and technology for rapidly building a
  modern India, and a significant component of his industrialisation plans was the nuclear programme
  initiated in the late 1940s under the guidance of Homi J. Bhabha. India wanted to generate atomic
  energy for peaceful purposes.
• Nehru’s position. He was against nuclear weapons and pleaded with the superpowers
  for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The nuclear arsenal kept rising all the same.
• The NPT. When Communist China conducted nuclear tests in October 1964, the five nuclear
  weapon powers, the US, USSR, UK, France and China, who were also the five Permanent Members of the
  UN Security Council, tried to impose the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 on the rest of the
  world. India always considered the NPT discriminatory and refused to sign it, because such treaties
  were selectively applicable to the non-nuclear powers and legitimised the monopoly of the five.
• May 1974. India conducted its first nuclear explosion and termed it a peaceful explosion,
  arguing that it was committed to using nuclear power only for peaceful purposes. The test came in a
  difficult domestic period, after the Arab-Israel War of 1973 and the Oil Shock had produced high
  inflation and many agitations, including a nationwide railway strike.
• 1995 and 1998. India opposed the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and refused to
  sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In May 1998 it conducted a series of nuclear tests,
  demonstrating its capacity to use nuclear energy for military purposes. Pakistan soon followed,
  increasing the vulnerability of the region to a nuclear exchange, and sanctions were imposed on both
  countries and subsequently waived.
• The doctrine. India’s nuclear doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence
  professes “no first use” and reiterates India’s commitment to global, verifiable
  and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear weapons free world.

(b) Consensus in foreign policy matters.

• What it means. Although there are minor differences among political parties about how to
  conduct external relations, Indian politics is generally marked by a broad agreement among the
  parties on national integration, on the protection of international boundaries, and on questions of
  national interest.
• The consequence. Because of that agreement, foreign policy has played only a limited role
  in party politics, both through the decade of 1962-1971 when India faced three wars and later, when
  different parties came to power from time to time.
• Where differences did exist. Some parties and leaders, including Dr Ambedkar, the
  Bharatiya Jan Sangh and later the Swatantra Party, wanted India to be closer to the US-led bloc. The
  Janata Party government of 1977 announced it would follow genuine non-alignment, implying that the
  pro-Soviet tilt would be corrected. In the post-1990 period ruling parties have often been criticised
  for a pro-US foreign policy.
• The limit of the differences. These are differences of emphasis. Since 1977, all
  governments, Congress and non-Congress alike, have taken initiatives for restoring better relations
  with China and entering into close ties with the US, which is the consensus in action.

Q. India’s foreign policy was built around the principles of peace and cooperation. But
India fought three wars in a space of ten years between 1962 and 1971. Would you say that this was a
failure of the foreign policy? Or would you say that this was a result of international situation? Give
reasons to support your answer.

Answer. The honest answer takes both halves and then decides. The evidence in the chapter
supports the view that the wars were largely a result of the international situation, with one real
failure of judgement inside it.

Why it was mainly the international situation.

• In every one of the three wars the first move came from the other side. China launched a swift
  and massive invasion in October 1962; Pakistan launched armed attacks in the Rann of Kutch in April
  1965 and a bigger offensive in Jammu and Kashmir in August and September; and in December 1971
  Pakistani aircrafts attacked Punjab and Rajasthan while its army moved on the Jammu and Kashmir
  front.
• The disputes were inherited, not created. The British government left behind the legacy of many
  international disputes, the conflict with Pakistan started just after partition over Jammu and
  Kashmir, and the China boundary question turned on whether colonial decisions still applied.
• The bloc rivalry of the Cold War made each dispute worse. Pakistan joined the US-led military
  alliances, and by 1971 the US-China rapprochement had produced a US-Pakistan-China axis that India
  had to counter.
• India ended each war rather than extending it: it accepted the UN intervention in 1965 and
  declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1971 once Bangladesh was free, then signed at Tashkent and at
  Shimla.

Where the foreign policy did fail.

• The reading of China was wrong. Nehru thought an attack was “exceedingly unlikely”
  although Vallabhbhai Patel was worried about it, and for a very long time the Chinese border was
  guarded by para-military forces, not the army. The chapter records that Nehru was severely criticised
  for his naive assessment of Chinese intentions and the lack of military preparedness.
• Peace as a principle was not matched by preparation, which is why India had to approach the
  Americans and the British for military assistance in the middle of the crisis.

Conclusion. Fighting a war you did not start is not by itself a failure of foreign policy.
The failure was narrower and specific: not preparing for a neighbour whose intentions had already
changed. The policy of peace and cooperation itself continued to work, which is why India could get aid
and assistance from both blocs, keep the Indus Waters Treaty alive through every crisis, and end each
war at the negotiating table.

Q. Does India’s foreign policy reflect her desire to be an important regional power?
Argue your case with the Bangladesh war of 1971 as an example.

Answer. Yes, and the 1971 war is the clearest evidence of it.

1. India acted on a crisis in its own neighbourhood rather than waiting for others. Pakistan
faced its biggest internal crisis from 1970, when its first general election produced a split verdict
and its rulers refused to accept the democratic verdict or the Awami League’s demand for a
federation. When the Pakistani army arrested Sheikh Mujib and unleashed a reign of terror in early
1971, India extended moral and material support to the freedom struggle in Bangladesh.

2. India carried a regional burden that no other power took on. Throughout 1971 India bore
the burden of about 80 lakh refugees who fled East Pakistan and took shelter in neighbouring areas of
India.

3. India balanced the great powers instead of yielding to them. Support for Pakistan came
from the US and China, and Henry Kissinger, adviser to President Richard Nixon, made a secret visit to
China via Pakistan in July 1971. To counter the US-Pakistan-China axis, India signed a 20-year Treaty
of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in August 1971, which assured India of Soviet support if
it faced any attack. A state that arranges the balance of power around itself is behaving as a regional
power.

4. India demonstrated decisive military capacity. India retaliated with the air force, navy
and army on both the Western and the Eastern front. Within ten days the Indian army had surrounded
Dhaka from three sides and the Pakistani army of about 90,000 had to surrender. Most people in India
saw this as a moment of glory and a clear sign of India’s growing military prowess.

5. India then chose restraint and a settlement. With Bangladesh a free country, India declared
a unilateral ceasefire, and the Shimla Agreement between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on
3 July 1972 formalised the return of peace. Stopping once the objective was won, and settling by
agreement, is how a regional power converts a victory into standing.

The other side, briefly. The chapter also shows the limits of that ambition. The wars derailed
the five-year plans, defence expenditure increased enormously, and by 1999 the Kargil conflict showed
that the region was still not settled. Regional influence was real, but it was expensive.

Q. How does political leadership of a nation affect its foreign policy? Explain this with the
help of examples from India’s foreign policy.

Answer. Leadership decides the emphasis, the timing and the risks a country is willing to
take, even where the broad national interest is agreed. India’s own record shows this at every
change of leader.

1. Nehru, 1946 to 1964. He was Prime Minister and his own foreign minister, and the chapter
says he “exercised profound influence in the formulation and implementation of India’s
foreign policy” and “possessed considerable leeway”. Non-alignment, the three
objectives of sovereignty, territorial integrity and rapid economic development, Panchsheel with Zhou
Enlai in 1954, the Asian Relations Conference of March 1947, the support for Indonesia in 1949, the
opposition to apartheid and the co-founding of the NAM were all pursued under his leadership, even
though some, including Dr Ambedkar and later the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party, wanted a
pro-US policy.

2. The same leadership can misjudge. Nehru thought an attack by China “exceedingly
unlikely” while Vallabhbhai Patel was worried about it. After October 1962 his own stature
suffered, he was criticised for his naive assessment of Chinese intentions and the lack of military
preparedness, and the first no-confidence motion against his government was moved in the Lok Sabha.

3. Lal Bahadur Shastri, 1965. Faced with a Pakistani offensive in Jammu and Kashmir, he
ordered Indian troops to launch a counter-offensive on the Punjab border to ease the pressure on the
Kashmir front, and the Indian army reached close to Lahore. He then signed the Tashkent Agreement with
General Ayub Khan in January 1966.

4. Indira Gandhi, 1971. She signed the 20-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet
Union in August 1971, took the country into a full-scale war in December, declared a unilateral
ceasefire once Bangladesh was free, and signed the Shimla Agreement on 3 July 1972. Her personal
popularity soared further after the war and the Congress won large majorities in most State assembly
elections that followed.

5. A change of government, a change of tilt. The Janata Party government that came to power in
1977 announced that it would follow genuine non-alignment, implying that the pro-Soviet tilt in the
foreign policy would be corrected. Since then all governments, Congress or non-Congress, have taken
initiatives for restoring better relations with China and entering into close ties with the US.

The limit. Leadership shapes policy but does not remake it, because parties broadly agree on
national integration, the protection of international boundaries and questions of national interest.
That is why, across all these leaders, foreign policy has played only a limited role in party
politics.

Q. Read this passage and answer the questions below:

“Broadly, non-alignment means not tying yourself off with military blocs….It means
trying to view things, as far as possible, not from the military point of view, though that has to come
in sometimes, but independently, and trying to maintain friendly relations with all
countries.” Jawaharlal Nehru

(a) Why does Nehru want to keep off military blocs?
(b) Do you think that the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty violated the principle of non-alignment? Give
reasons for your answer.
(c) If there were no military blocs, do you think non-alignment would have been unnecessary?

(a) Why does Nehru want to keep off military blocs?

• To keep the power to judge each issue on its own. The passage itself gives the reason: not
  viewing things from the military point of view but independently. A member of a bloc has to see every
  question through its bloc’s military interest.
• To be friendly with everyone. The passage ends on maintaining friendly relations with all
  countries. Writing to K. P. S. Menon in January 1947 he had put it even more plainly: avoid
  entanglement in power politics, be friendly to both the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc, and
  join neither.
• Because independence itself was at stake. For Nehru, once foreign relations pass into
  somebody else’s charge you are not independent to that extent. Joining NATO or the Warsaw Pact
  would have handed over exactly that.
• Because India needed help from both sides. A poor new country whose first task was poverty
  alleviation could not afford to close off half the world. By staying out, India could get aid and
  assistance from members of both blocs.

(b) Did the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty violate the principle of non-alignment?

The chapter puts this doubt in its own margin, asking whether India could still be called
non-aligned after signing it. A balanced answer states both sides and then decides.

The case that it did not. Non-alignment, in Nehru’s own definition above, means not
tying yourself to military blocs. The 1971 agreement was a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, not
membership of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It was a response to a specific and immediate threat: support for
Pakistan was coming from both the US and China, Kissinger had made his secret visit to China via
Pakistan in July 1971, and India signed the treaty in order to counter the US-Pakistan-China axis. India
also kept its freedom of action, deciding on its own when to enter the war and when to declare a
unilateral ceasefire.

The case that it did. The treaty assured India of Soviet support if the country faced any
attack, which is close to what a security alliance does, and it tied India to one superpower at the very
moment the other two great powers were on the opposite side. That this was seen as a departure is not
only a student’s doubt: the Janata Party government of 1977 announced that it would follow genuine
non-alignment, which implied that a pro-Soviet tilt had developed and needed correcting.

Conclusion. The treaty stretched non-alignment without breaking it. India did not join a
military bloc and did not surrender its right to decide, but the balance that non-alignment was supposed
to keep did lean, and the correction announced in 1977 is the chapter’s own acknowledgement of
that lean.

(c) If there were no military blocs, would non-alignment have been unnecessary?

The name would have been unnecessary; the policy behind it would not.

• The word would lose its meaning. Non-alignment is defined against something: not tying
  yourself off with military blocs. With no NATO and no Warsaw Pact there is nothing to be
  non-aligned from.
• But its reasons would survive. Nehru’s definition has two more parts, viewing things
  independently and keeping friendly relations with all countries, and neither depends on blocs. A
  developing country short of resources would still need to judge each issue for itself.
• Domination does not need a bloc. The chapter shows developing countries supporting the
  foreign policy preferences of whoever gave them aid or credits: economic pressure, not military.
• What followed the Cold War proves it. Its end changed the context of international
  relations entirely, and the contemporary situation is more influenced by economic than by military
  interests. India’s policy did not disappear, it shifted to a more pro-US strategy, dictated as
  always by ideas of national interest.

Q. How well did the Indian state live up to these principles in the first two decades after Independence? You may come back to this question after reading the chapter.

Answer. Largely well, with some clear limits. Promoting international peace and security: India followed non-alignment, stayed out of both Cold War blocs, led the world protest when Britain attacked Egypt over the Suez Canal in 1956, and with Zhou Enlai enunciated Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, on 29 April 1954. Just and honourable relations between nations: India convened the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, supported Indonesia’s freedom struggle, took part in the Bandung Conference of 1955 and was a co-founder of the NAM, whose first summit was held at Belgrade in September 1961. Peaceful settlement of disputes: the long-term dispute over sharing river waters with Pakistan was resolved through mediation by the World Bank, and the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960.

The limits. India could not avoid conflict: China invaded in October 1962 and Pakistan attacked in 1965, and the boundary dispute with China could not be resolved despite long correspondence among top leaders. The balance was not always perfect either; in 1956 India did not join the public condemnation when the USSR invaded Hungary. So India followed these principles in its policy, but international circumstances did not always allow it to secure peace.

Q. It’s the fourth chapter and it’s Nehru once again! Was he a superman or what? Or has his role been glorified?

Answer. Neither is quite right. Nehru keeps appearing because of the offices he held: he was his own foreign minister, and both as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister he exercised profound influence on the formulation and implementation of India’s foreign policy from 1946 to 1964. The chapter does not present him as a superman. It records his mistakes too: he thought it was ‘exceedingly unlikely’ that India would face an attack from China, after the 1962 war his own stature suffered as he was severely criticised for his naive assessment of the Chinese intentions and the lack of military preparedness, and for the first time a no-confidence motion against his government was moved in the Lok Sabha. His role therefore mattered a great deal, but the chapter judges it, it does not glorify it. (This is a discussion question; give your own view with reasons.)

Q. Did we have more recognition and power in the world when we were younger, poorer and more vulnerable than now? Isn’t that strange?

Answer. It looks strange but it has an explanation. Newly independent India had little material power, but it had great moral standing. C. Rajagopalachari wrote in 1950 that a country without material, men or money, the three means of power, was fast coming to be recognised as the biggest moral power in the civilised world. That recognition came from the ideals of the freedom struggle, from India’s leadership of the newly independent Asian and African nations, and from non-alignment, which let India take an independent stand and get aid from members of both blocs. So in those years India’s voice counted because of its principles, not its wealth or weapons. (This is a discussion question; you may argue that India’s power has actually grown since.)

Q. Why do we say India and Pakistan had a war? Leaders quarrel and armies fight wars. Most ordinary citizens have nothing to do with these.

Answer. We say ‘India and Pakistan’ because a war is fought between states, in the name of the whole country, and its costs fall on every citizen, not only on leaders and soldiers. The chapter shows this: the 1965 war added to India’s already difficult economic situation, and after 1962 scarce resources were diverted to the defence sector, so the conflicts with neighbours derailed the five-year plans and the Third Plan (1961-66) was affected. In 1971 India had to bear the burden of about 80 lakh refugees who fled East Pakistan. At the same time the note has a point: ordinary people on both sides usually have no quarrel with each other, which is why efforts to restore normal relations, such as the train and bus services that operate between the two countries, matter. (This is a discussion question; give your own view with reasons.)

Q. This sounds like joining the Soviet bloc. Can we say that we were non-aligned even after signing this treaty with the Soviet Union?

Answer. Yes, broadly. The 20-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship of August 1971 was signed to counter the US-Pakistan-China axis that was forming at the time, when the Bangladesh crisis was growing. It was a treaty of friendship with one country for a specific threat; India did not join the Warsaw Pact or any military bloc, and non-alignment meant not tying oneself to military blocs while keeping friendly relations with all countries. Critics did see a pro-Soviet tilt, and the Janata Party government of 1977 promised to follow ‘genuine’ non-alignment to correct it. So the treaty moved India closer to the Soviet Union, but India remained outside the Cold War alliances.

Q. I am confused! Isn’t it all about atom bombs? Why don’t we say so?

Answer. The note is reacting to India calling its first nuclear test, in May 1974, a ‘peaceful explosion’. India’s stated position was that it was committed to using nuclear power only for peaceful purposes: the programme had begun in the late 1940s under Homi J. Bhabha to generate atomic energy, and Nehru was against nuclear weapons and pleaded for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. India also refused to sign the NPT of 1968 because it was discriminatory, binding only the countries without weapons. So the programme was not only about bombs, although the test did show that India had the capability, and after the tests of May 1998 India adopted a nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence with ‘no first use’.