Class 11 Political Science Chapter 3 Election and Representation NCERT Solutions

Q. Which of the following resembles most a direct democracy?
(a) Discussions in a family meeting
(b) Election of the class monitor
(c) Choice of a candidate by a political party
(d) Decisions taken by the Gram Sabha
(e) Opinion polls conducted by the media

Answer: (d). In a Gram Sabha, all adult members of the village take part directly in the meeting and decide openly, without going through any representative. This is the closest real example of direct democracy. A family meeting is not a formal political process, electing a class monitor is itself an act of choosing a representative, a party’s candidate selection is an internal process, and a media opinion poll is not a binding decision at all.

Q. Which of the following tasks are not performed by the Election Commission?
(a) Preparing the Electoral Rolls
(b) Nominating the candidates
(c) Setting up polling booths
(d) Implementing the model code of conduct
(e) Supervising the Panchayat elections

Answer: (b) and (e). Nomination of candidates is done by the candidate or their party, the Election Commission only oversees the process of scrutinising nominations, it does not nominate anyone itself. Panchayat and municipal elections are supervised by the State Election Commissioners, not the Election Commission of India. Preparing electoral rolls, setting up polling booths, and implementing the model code of conduct are all genuine Election Commission tasks.

Q. Which of the following is common to the method of election of the members of Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha?
(a) Every citizen above the age of 18 is an eligible voter
(b) Voter can give preference order for different candidates
(c) Every vote has equal value
(d) The winner must get more than half the votes

Answer: (c). In both systems, every vote carries equal weight. The other options are wrong: (a) Rajya Sabha voters are MLAs, not ordinary citizens, so the age-18 rule applies only to Lok Sabha elections. (b) Preference ordering only happens in the Rajya Sabha’s STV system, not in Lok Sabha’s FPTP. (d) Rajya Sabha winners must cross a quota, but Lok Sabha winners need not get more than half the votes.

Q. In the First Past the Post system, that candidate is declared winner who:
(a) Secures the largest number of postal ballots
(b) Belongs to the party that has the highest number of votes in the country
(c) Has more votes than any other candidate in the constituency
(d) Attains first position by securing more than 50% votes

Answer: (c). Under FPTP, the winner is simply whoever gets more votes than every other candidate in their own constituency, regardless of whether that is less than half the total votes cast there. The party’s national vote tally or the count of postal ballots specifically has nothing to do with who wins.

Q. What is the difference between the system of reservation of constituencies and the system of separate electorate? Why did the Constitution makers reject the latter?

Answer:
1. Difference: Under a separate electorate, only voters belonging to a particular community elected that community’s representative, meaning the voters themselves were divided along community lines. Under reservation, all voters of a constituency, of any community, can vote, but only a candidate belonging to the reserved community can stand.
2. Why it was rejected: Members of the Constituent Assembly, such as Tajamul Husain, warned that separate electorates had been a curse to India and had done incalculable harm to the country.
3. The fear was that this system would keep communities isolated from the national mainstream rather than helping them integrate into it, weakening national unity.
4. Adivasi representatives like Jaipal Singh also supported reservation of seats over separate electorates, saying they wanted to mix into the nation, not remain apart from it.

Q. Which of the following statements are incorrect? Identify and correct them by substituting, adding or rearranging only one word or phrase.
(a) FPTP system is followed for all the elections in India.
(b) Election Commission does not supervise Panchayat and Municipal elections.
(c) President of India cannot remove an Election Commissioner.
(d) Appointment of more than one Election Commissioner in the Election Commission is mandatory.

Answer:
(a) is incorrect. Correction: “FPTP system is followed for most elections in India” (the Rajya Sabha, President and Vice President elections use PR/STV instead, so ‘all’ is wrong).
(c) is incorrect. Correction: “President of India can remove an Election Commissioner” (the President can remove Election Commissioners, though removing the Chief Election Commissioner needs a special majority recommendation of both Houses).
(d) is incorrect. Correction: “Appointment of more than one Election Commissioner in the Election Commission is not mandatory” (the book says the Election Commission of India can either be a single member or a multi-member body; it was single-member till 1989 and has been multi-member since 1993).
Only (b) is a correct statement, because Panchayat and Municipal elections are supervised by the State Election Commissioners.

Q. Indian electoral system aims at ensuring representation of socially disadvantaged sections. However we have only 12 percent women members in our legislatures. What measures would you suggest to improve the situation?

Answer:
1. Legal reservation: Fully implement the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 2023, which provides for women’s reservation in the Lok Sabha and Assemblies.
2. Better ticket distribution: Encourage or require political parties to set a minimum share of women candidates in their lists.
3. Building political participation: The experience of women’s reservation already in place in local bodies shows that it raises both women’s participation and their leadership skills, this same experience can be extended to higher levels.
4. Awareness and support: Run awareness campaigns to build voter confidence in women candidates, and provide elected women representatives with training and resources.

Q. Here are some wishes expressed in a conference to discuss a constitution for a new country. Write against each of these whether FPTP or Proportional Representation system is more suited to meet each of these wishes.
(a) People should clearly know who is their representative so that they can hold him or her personally accountable.
(b) We have small linguistic minorities who are spread all over the country; we should ensure fair representation to them.
(c) There should be no discrepancy between votes and seats for different parties.
(d) People should be able to elect a good candidate even if they do not like his or her political party.

Answer:
(a) FPTP is suitable. Each constituency has only one representative under FPTP, so voters clearly know whom to approach.
(b) PR is suitable. Small, scattered linguistic minorities cannot form a majority in any single constituency, so FPTP would give them almost no seats anywhere. PR can add up their votes across the whole country and give them fair representation.
(c) PR is suitable. PR is defined by giving every party seats exactly in proportion to its votes, so there is no discrepancy between votes and seats.
(d) FPTP is suitable. In FPTP, the voter votes directly for a candidate, so they can pick a good individual candidate even from a party they otherwise dislike. In PR, the voter votes for a party, and individual choice of this kind is lost.

Q. A former Chief Election Commissioner joined a political party and contested elections. There are two views on this. One view is that a former CEC is an independent citizen with a right to join any party and contest. The other view is that leaving this possibility open can affect the impartiality of the Election Commission, so former CECs should not be allowed to contest any elections. Which position do you agree with and why?

Answer: The second view carries more weight, for these reasons:
1. The Election Commission’s greatest strength is its perceived impartiality. If a CEC can join a party right after leaving office, there is a real risk that decisions taken while still in office could be shaped by future political ambitions.
2. Even the mere suspicion is damaging, because the Commission’s credibility rests not only on being impartial but on being seen as impartial by the public.
3. Still, the individual-rights argument is not weak either, every citizen has a fundamental right to participate in politics and contest elections, and that right should not be permanently taken away because of one former position.
4. A balanced solution could be a fixed ‘cooling-off period’ after a CEC or Election Commissioner leaves office, during which they cannot take up a political position, similar to restrictions placed on some other constitutional posts.

Q. “Indian democracy is now ready to shift from a crude First Past the Post system to a system of Proportional Representation.” Do you agree with this statement? Give your reasons for or against this statement.

Answer: This is an open question, either side can be argued with sound reasoning.
In favour of shifting to PR:
1. FPTP can produce large gaps between votes and seats, as seen in the 1984 example.
2. PR could give better representation to small and scattered communities.
Against shifting to PR:
3. FPTP’s simplicity and clear accountability are its biggest strengths, PR makes it harder for a voter to identify their own personal representative.
4. In a vast and diverse country like India, PR could make forming a stable parliamentary government harder, as Israel’s frequent coalition governments suggest.
5. FPTP has so far delivered peaceful transfers of power and stable governments, abandoning it entirely could be risky.
A balanced conclusion: Rather than fully switching to PR, India might consider a mixed model combining both systems, as some countries already do, to keep simplicity and stability while improving representation.

Q. Can we have democracy without holding elections? Can we hold elections without having democracy?

Answer. A large modern democracy cannot work without elections. All citizens cannot take part directly in every decision, so they elect representatives, and elections are the method of choosing them. Direct democracy without elections is possible only on a small scale, as in the ancient Greek city-states or a gram sabha. On the other hand, elections can be held without democracy: many non-democratic rulers hold elections, but in such a way that their rule is never threatened, so the elections are not free and fair. Elections are necessary for democracy, but not sufficient.

Q. They say elections are carnival of democracy. But this cartoon depicts chaos instead. Is this true of elections always? Is it good for democracy?

Answer. Not always. Elections in a country as large as India do involve noise, crowds and confusion, with lakhs of candidates’ supporters, rallies and campaigns. But behind the noise, elections are conducted in an orderly way by the Election Commission, with rules, a schedule and a model code of conduct, and the results are accepted by everyone. The excitement and participation are good for democracy, because they show people care about choosing their government. Real chaos, such as violence, rigging or intimidation, is bad for democracy, and the Election Commission has the power to prevent it, even by postponing or cancelling a poll.

Q. Can you think of some examples of such non-democratic elections? What do you think would distinguish a democratic from a non-democratic election? What can be done to ensure that elections in a country would be conducted in a democratic way?

Answer. Examples include countries where a single ruling party allows no real opposition, or where military rulers hold elections only to appear democratic, and the result is known in advance. A democratic election is distinguished by: every adult having the right to vote; every citizen having the right to contest; a real choice among candidates and parties; free campaigning; a secret ballot; fair counting by an impartial body; and acceptance of the result even when the ruling party loses. To ensure this, the basic rules about who can vote, who can contest, who supervises elections and how votes are counted should be written in the constitution, and an independent Election Commission should conduct the elections.

Q. What is the need of writing these rules in the constitution? Why can’t these be decided by the Parliament? Or by all the parties before every election?

Answer. Because these rules decide who wins, they must be fixed before the game begins, by an authority that is above the players. Parliament is controlled by the ruling party, which is itself a player; if it could change the rules at will, it could change them to suit itself before every election. Getting all parties to agree before every election would be uncertain and unstable, and the stronger parties could dominate. Writing the basic rules in the constitution puts them beyond the reach of any one government, just as the rules of a game and the umpire are agreed upon before play starts. The details are still filled in by laws passed by the legislature.

Q. Collect newspaper clippings about elections in India and any other country. Classify the clippings in the following categories: a. System of representation; b. Voter eligibility; c. Role of the Election Commission. If you have access to internet, visit the websites of the Election Commission of India and the ACE project, The Electoral Knowledge Network, and collect the information mentioned above for at least four countries.

Answer. This is a project activity; your clippings will be your own. A sample classification: (a) System of representation: reports on Lok Sabha results won under FPTP, on Rajya Sabha elections, or on proportional representation elections abroad, such as in Israel or the Netherlands. (b) Voter eligibility: reports on enrolment of new voters at 18, revision of voters’ lists, or overseas voters. (c) Role of the Election Commission: announcement of the election schedule, the model code of conduct, a re-poll ordered in a booth, or transfer of officers during elections. For four countries, you could compare India (FPTP, voting age 18), the United Kingdom (FPTP), Israel (PR, the whole country one constituency) and Argentina or Portugal (PR with multi-member constituencies).

Q. Hold mock elections in your class to elect four class representatives in three different ways: one vote each, top four win; four votes each that may be given to one candidate or split, top four win; preference ranking counted by the Rajya Sabha method. Did the same four persons win the election in each of these methods? If not, what was the difference? Why?

Answer. Usually the same four do not win in all three methods. With one vote each, the most popular candidates of the largest group in the class tend to take all four places. With four votes that can be pooled, a smaller group can give all its votes to one candidate and get that candidate elected, so a minority gets represented. With preference ranking and a quota (as in Rajya Sabha elections), votes of eliminated candidates are transferred to second preferences, so the result reflects the whole class’s choices more fairly. The difference shows the chapter’s main point: the rules of counting votes decide who wins, some rules favour bigger groups and some help smaller ones.

Q. Less than 50 per cent votes and more than 80 per cent seats! Isn’t that unfair? How could our Constitution makers accept such an unfair system?

Answer. It does look unfair, because votes for losing candidates go “waste”. But the Constitution makers accepted FPTP for good reasons: it is simple for ordinary voters to understand; it gives each constituency one representative who can be held accountable; it usually gives the largest party or coalition some bonus seats, which helps form a stable government in a parliamentary system; and it encourages different social groups to come together to win in a locality, instead of each community forming its own party. They also added reserved constituencies so that oppressed groups would not be left unrepresented.

Q. This is very confusing! How do I know who is my MP or my MLA in this system? Who would I go to if I have any work?

Answer. That is exactly a weakness of PR. Under PR voters choose a party, not a candidate, and representatives are taken from party lists; in a multi-member constituency several representatives of different parties come from the same area. So there is no one representative who represents and is responsible for one locality. A voter would usually approach the local office of the party he or she supports, or any of the area’s representatives. Under FPTP, by contrast, every constituency has exactly one MP or MLA who can be held accountable, which is one reason India chose FPTP.

Q. The following table shows the result of the 2015 elections to the Knesset. Based on this, you can find out what percentage of seats various parties got in that election.

Answer. The Knesset has 120 seats, so % of seats = seats ÷ 120 × 100:
Likud: 30 seats = 25.00% (votes 23.40%)
Zionist Camp: 24 seats = 20.00% (votes 18.67%)
Joint List: 13 seats = 10.83% (votes 10.61%)
Yesh Atid: 11 seats = 9.17% (votes 8.82%)
Kulanu: 10 seats = 8.33% (votes 7.49%)
Habayit Hayehudi: 8 seats = 6.67% (votes 6.74%)
Shas: 7 seats = 5.83% (votes 5.74%)
Yisrael Beitenu: 6 seats = 5.00% (votes 5.10%)
United Torah Judaism: 6 seats = 5.00% (votes 4.99%)
Israel’s Left: 5 seats = 4.17% (votes 3.93%)
Other parties: 0 seats = 0% (votes 4.51%, each below the 3.25% minimum).
Every party’s share of seats is close to its share of votes; the small differences arise because the votes of parties below 3.25% are not counted for seats. No party came near a majority of 61 seats, so a coalition government had to be formed.

Q. These members of the ruling party are trying to listen to the ‘tiny’ opposition! Was this the effect of our electoral system?

Answer. Not in 1949 itself. When this cartoon appeared (29 May 1949), no general election had yet been held under the Constitution: the Constituent Assembly, which was also working as the legislature, had been elected indirectly by the provincial assemblies, and the Congress dominated it. The tiny opposition then reflected the Congress party’s dominance after the national movement, not the working of FPTP. But the cartoon points to an effect FPTP did have later: the largest party wins many more seats than its share of votes, while the votes of losing candidates go waste, so opposition parties with a sizeable vote share can win very few seats. In the early general elections this, together with the Congress party’s dominance, kept the opposition small; since 1989 the same FPTP system has produced coalitions and stronger opposition parties.

Q. Here are the results of the Tamil Nadu Assembly Election held in 2016 (total seats 234). What would be the composition of the Assembly if it was a PR system like in Israel? Which party would have a majority? Who would form the government? What would be the effect of this system on the relationship of political parties?

Answer. Allotting 234 seats in proportion to the votes (leaving out the 1.30% NOTA votes), the Assembly would be roughly: AIADMK 97 (instead of 135), DMK 75 (88), INC 15 (8), PMK 12 (0), BJP 7 (0), DMDK 6 (0), CPI 2 (0), IUML 2 (1), other parties 15 (0), independents 3 (0). If Israel’s 3.25% minimum were also applied, BJP, DMDK, CPI, IUML and the independents would get no seats and their share would go to the larger parties. In either case, no party would have a majority, since 118 seats are needed. The government would have to be a coalition, most likely led by the AIADMK, the largest party, with the support of smaller parties. The effect would be that parties have to bargain and form alliances after the election, smaller parties would gain influence, and governments would be less stable than under FPTP.

Q. The proportion of Muslims in the population of India is about 14.2 per cent, but the number of Muslim MPs in the Lok Sabha has usually been less than 6 per cent. Three students drew different conclusions. Hilal: This demonstrates the unfairness of the FPTP system. We should have opted for PR system. Arif: What is needed is a reservation of seats for Muslims on the same lines as for SC and ST. Saba: Muslim women are not going to get any share in any of these systems. We need a separate quota for Muslim women. Write down whether and why you agree or disagree with each of them.

Answer. Hilal is partly right: under FPTP a group that is a minority in most constituencies can lose everywhere, and PR would let parties win seats in proportion to votes. But PR does not by itself guarantee more Muslim representatives, since that depends on whom parties put on their lists, and PR has its own costs, such as unstable governments and parties formed on community lines. Arif’s suggestion is difficult: the Constitution makers rejected representation on the basis of religion, as Tajamul Husain’s speech shows, and reservation for SC and ST rests on caste-based discrimination and exclusion, not on religion. Saba makes a valid point that within any group women are the least represented, but a separate religion-based quota for Muslim women would run into the same objection; it would be better to increase women’s representation generally, as the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam does, and for parties to give more tickets to Muslim candidates and to women.

Q. Am I or am I not an adult? I am mature enough to choose my future career, old enough to get a driving license, but not old enough to vote! If laws can apply to me, why can’t I decide on who makes those laws?

Answer. The student’s argument is strong, and it is the reason the voting age was lowered. Till 1989 an adult Indian meant a citizen above 21; a constitutional amendment in 1989 reduced the voting age to 18. A person of 18 can choose a career, drive and is subject to the laws, so it is fair that he or she should also have a say in choosing the lawmakers. Universal adult franchise rests on the belief that all adult citizens are equally able to decide what is good for themselves and for the country.

Q. Why is universal adult franchise compared to an elephant? Is it unmanageable? Or is it like the story in which everyone describes the elephant only by its parts?

Answer. It is shown as an elephant because giving the vote to every adult in a country as large and diverse as India, in the first general election of 1951-52, was a huge and unprecedented task, and many doubted that crores of voters, most of them illiterate, could vote wisely. It has not proved unmanageable: seventeen Lok Sabha elections had been held by the time of the book (the eighteenth followed in 2024), with growing participation. The story of the blind men and the elephant also fits: each person or group sees only one part of the electorate (its own caste, region or interest), while universal franchise is the whole body of the people, which no single part can describe or control.

Q. Has this now been settled? Or can the government go back to a single member Election Commission? Does the Constitution allow this game?

Answer. It has been settled in practice, not by the Constitution. The Constitution allows the Election Commission to be either a single-member or a multi-member body, so a government could legally reduce it to one member again; this is in fact what happened after the 1989 elections, when it reverted to a single member. Since 1993 it has remained multi-member, and there is now a general consensus that a multi-member Commission is more appropriate because power is shared and there is greater accountability. So going back would be legally possible, but it would be strongly criticised as an attempt to weaken the Commission.

Q. Imagine that your class has a total student strength of 57. But on the day of voting, only 51 students are present and 50 students participated in voting. When would you say that the resolution has been passed with ‘special majority’ in this situation? Find out the other two places in this book where special majority is discussed.

Answer. Special majority needs both conditions. Two-thirds of those present and voting: two-thirds of 50 is 33.3, so at least 34 votes in favour. Simple majority of the total membership: more than half of 57, so at least 29 votes in favour. Both are met when at least 34 students vote for the resolution, so the resolution is passed with special majority if 34 or more of the 50 voters support it. Besides the impeachment of the President (in the chapter on the Executive), special majority is discussed for the removal of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts (in the chapter on Judiciary) and for amending the Constitution (in the chapter on the Constitution as a Living Document).

Q. The Netaji is afraid of EC. Why do leaders fear the Election Commission? Is this good for democracy?

Answer. Leaders fear the Election Commission because it has asserted its powers: it enforces the model code of conduct, controls the officials on election duty and can transfer them, can order a re-poll or recount, and can postpone or cancel an election that is not free and fair. Leaders who hope to use money, muscle power or government machinery to win cannot do so easily. Yes, this is good for democracy, because elections become free and fair only when those in power cannot bend the rules, and the voter’s confidence in the system grows.

Q. Why do you think does the Election Commission have the following powers and privileges? What could have happened if these did not exist? (i) The Commission can issue orders to government employees engaged in any election related duty. (ii) The government cannot remove the Chief Election Commissioner. (iii) The Commission can cancel an election if it thinks that it was not fair.

Answer.
(i) The Commission has very limited staff of its own and conducts elections through the government’s administrative machinery. It needs control over these officers so that they act in a non-partisan way. Without this power, the ruling party could use officers to favour its own candidates.
(ii) The CEC can be removed only on a recommendation of both Houses of Parliament with a special majority. This security of tenure lets the CEC act fearlessly. Without it, a ruling party could remove a CEC who refused to favour it.
(iii) This power protects the purity of the election. Without it, an election vitiated by rigging, violence or intimidation would have to stand, and its result would not reflect the will of the voters.

Q. Can we reduce the influence of money and muscle power by changing the law? Does anything change in reality by changing the law?

Answer. Laws can help: limits on election expenses, state funding of elections, barring candidates with criminal cases, and regulating parties can all reduce the influence of money and muscle. But laws alone are not enough. The chapter points out that there are limits to what laws and formal provisions can do: free and fair elections can be held only if candidates, parties and those involved in the election process abide by the spirit of democratic competition. Change in reality also needs vigilant, active citizens and voluntary organisations working as watchdogs. The Election Commission’s own record shows that using existing powers effectively can change a great deal even without new laws.

Q. Should a person accused of a serious crime be barred from contesting elections?

Answer. There are arguments on both sides. In favour: lawmakers should have a clean record, and candidates with criminal cases bring muscle power into politics, so one of the reform suggestions is to bar candidates with any criminal case even if their appeal is pending. Against: a person is not guilty until a court has found him or her guilty, and false cases can be filed against opponents to keep them out of elections. At present the law disqualifies a person who has been imprisoned for two years or more. A balanced view is to bar persons against whom a court has framed charges for serious crimes, while protecting against false cases through speedy trials.