Class 11 Political Science Chapter 5 Legislature NCERT Solutions

Q. Alok thinks that a country needs an efficient government that looks after the welfare of the people. So, if we simply elected our Prime Minister and Ministers and left to them the task of government, we will not need a legislature. Do you agree? Give reasons for your answer.

Answer: No, I do not agree. A legislature is not merely a law-making body, it is the centre of the whole democratic political process and does far more than what an elected Prime Minister and Ministers could do alone.
1. It is the legislature that gives people the means to hold their representatives accountable, this is the very basis of representative democracy, and it would disappear if only the executive were elected.
2. It controls the executive through Question Hour, debate, financial control and the no-confidence motion, without which an elected Council of Ministers could exercise unlimited and arbitrary power, turning parliamentary democracy into Cabinet dictatorship.
3. It controls all public money, no tax can be imposed and no rupee can be spent without the legislature’s approval of the budget.
4. It is the country’s highest forum of debate, representing the divergent regional, social, economic and religious views of the whole country, something a small Council of Ministers cannot do by itself.
So an efficient government still needs a representative, effective legislature standing over it, otherwise there is no institution left to make it accountable to the people.

Q. A class was debating the merits of a bicameral system. The following points were made during the discussion. Read the arguments and say if you agree or disagree with each of them, giving reasons.
Neha said that bicameral legislature does not serve any purpose.
Tridib said that if a country is not a federation, then there is no need to have a second chamber.
Shama argued that experts should be nominated in the second chamber.

Answer:
Neha: I disagree. A bicameral legislature serves a real purpose, it makes it possible to have every decision reconsidered, since every bill and policy is discussed twice, giving a double check against a hasty decision by one House.
Tridib: I partly agree. A second chamber is especially valuable in a federation, since it gives representation to the States or regions, as the Rajya Sabha does in India. But a country need not be a federation to benefit from a second chamber, the “double check” function of reconsidering every decision is useful in any large, diverse country, federal or not.
Shama: I partly agree. India already nominates 12 members to the Rajya Sabha from among people who have made their mark in literature, science, art and social service, precisely so that expert opinion reaches Parliament without having to win an election. But a second chamber made up ONLY of nominated experts, with no elected members, would lose its democratic and representative character, so nomination should remain a small, additional feature rather than the chamber’s whole basis.

Q. Why can the Lok Sabha control the executive more effectively than the Rajya Sabha can?

Answer:
1. The Council of Ministers is responsible only to the Lok Sabha, not to the Rajya Sabha.
2. A no-confidence motion can be moved only in the Lok Sabha, and if it passes the entire government must resign. The Rajya Sabha can criticise the government but cannot remove it.
3. Final power over money bills and the budget rests with the Lok Sabha, so government spending runs on its approval alone.
4. The real reason behind all this is that the Lok Sabha is directly elected by the people. In our democracy, the people are the final authority, so the crucial powers of removing a government and controlling its finances were given to their directly elected representatives, not to the indirectly elected Rajya Sabha.

Q. Rather than effective control of the executive, the Lok Sabha is a platform for the expression of popular sentiments and people’s expectations. Do you agree? Give reasons.

Answer: I partly agree, the Lok Sabha does both, and it is not accurate to say it is “only” a platform for sentiment.
It genuinely is a platform for popular sentiment: Parliament represents the divergent regional, social, economic and religious views of the country, and its debating function lets members speak on any matter without fear, so public feeling on issues does get voiced there.
But it also exercises real control: through Question Hour, ministers must answer searching questions every day; through financial control, no money can be spent without its approval; and through the no-confidence motion, which has actually brought down governments since 1989. The fertilizer price rollbacks of 1998 and 2002 are concrete examples of the executive being forced to change course by Lok Sabha pressure.
So the Lok Sabha is a platform for sentiment AND an instrument of control, and these two roles reinforce each other rather than competing.

Q. The following are some proposals for making the Parliament more effective. State if you agree or disagree with each of them and give your reasons. Explain what would be the effect if these suggestions were accepted.
Parliament should work for a longer period.
Speakers should be empowered to penalise members for interrupting the proceedings of the House.
Attendance should be made compulsory for members of Parliament.

Answer:
Parliament should work for longer periods: I agree. Over the last two decades, Lok Sabha and State Assembly sessions have declined and the time spent on debate has fallen. Longer sessions would give members the “adequate time” the chapter itself names as a condition for effective control, allowing deeper discussion of bills and policy.
Speakers empowered to penalise interrupters: I agree. The presiding officer is already the final authority regulating the business of the House, and giving this power real teeth would reduce the walkouts and shouting that cause considerable loss of legislative time, while still preserving the members’ right to raise genuine protest through orderly means.
Attendance should be made compulsory: I agree, with care. Absence of quorum has weakened the House’s own power to control the executive through discussion, so compulsory attendance would directly fix this. But it must not become a way to punish members for legitimate constituency work or genuine emergencies.

Q. Arif wanted to know that if ministers propose most of the important bills and if the majority party often gets the government bills passed, what is the role of the Parliament in the law making process? What answer would you give him?

Answer:
1. Approval is never automatic, even a disciplined majority’s approval is the product of intense bargaining and negotiation among the ruling party, its coalition partners and the opposition.
2. If the government has a Lok Sabha majority but not a Rajya Sabha majority, it must make substantial concessions, as happened in 1977 and 2000, and the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Bill was rejected outright by the Rajya Sabha.
3. The real, detailed scrutiny of a bill happens in a parliamentary committee, a “miniature legislature” where a large part of the discussion on bills takes place and real changes are made.
4. Debate in the House forces the government to justify its bill publicly, and under this pressure governments have withdrawn proposals, such as the fertilizer price hikes of 1998 and 2002.
5. In coalition politics, a bill must be acceptable to all coalition partners, so a majority alone does not let the government act arbitrarily.
So Parliament may not write most bills, but it can block them, change them, and force the government to account for them, which is exactly why law-making is a political course of action, not merely a legal procedure.

Q. Which of the following statements you agree with the most? Give your reasons.
Legislators must be free to join any party they want.
Defection is always for selfish purposes and therefore, a legislator who wants to join another party must be disqualified from being a minister for the next two years.
Anti-defection law has contributed to the domination of the party leaders over the legislators.

Answer: I agree most with the third statement, that the anti-defection law has contributed to the domination of party leaders over legislators.
This is exactly what the chapter’s own evaluation says: the experience of the past twenty years shows the anti-defection amendment has not been able to curb defections, but it has given additional powers to the party leadership and the presiding officers of legislatures over the members.
The first statement goes too far, legislators being “free to join any party” without restriction is precisely what the 52nd Amendment was designed to prevent, since a member elected on one party’s ticket owes that mandate to the voters who chose them under that party’s banner.
The second statement is too absolute, treating every act of defection as automatically “selfish” ignores that a member might genuinely disagree with their party’s direction, and a blanket two-year disqualification does not address why the law has not actually curbed defection, it only raises the penalty without fixing the underlying problem the third statement identifies.

Q. Dolly and Sudha are debating about the efficiency and effectiveness of the Parliament in recent times. Dolly believed that the decline of Indian Parliament is evident in the less time spent on debate and discussion and increase in the disturbances of the functioning of the House and walkouts etc. Sudha contends that the fall of different governments on the floor of Lok Sabha is a proof of its vibrancy. What other arguments can you provide to support or oppose the positions of Dolly and Sudha?

Answer:
Supporting Dolly (decline): real scrutiny has shifted to committees, and Parliament rarely rejects their suggestions, so its own floor role has shrunk toward approval. The Cabinet initiates policy and sets the agenda, and no major bill is introduced without its approval, so Parliament often merely ratifies decisions already made elsewhere. Absence of quorum and opposition boycotts have further weakened the House’s own power to control the executive through discussion.
Supporting Sudha (vibrancy): even a very strong Cabinet must retain a majority in the Lok Sabha and answer to its satisfaction, this is the democratic potential of Parliament that never goes away. Beyond governments falling after 1989, the fertilizer price rollbacks of 1998 and 2002 show the House forcing policy reversals even without bringing a government down. Parliament remains the country’s most open forum of debate and, by its composition, the most representative organ of government.
Overall: both positions capture something real, Parliament’s day-to-day working has weakened in some respects (time, discipline, committee dependence), but its ultimate democratic power to make and unmake governments has not disappeared.

Q. Arrange the different stages of passing of a bill into a law in their correct sequence:
A resolution is passed to admit the bill for discussion
The bill is referred to the President of India, write what happens next if s/he does not sign it
The bill is referred to other House and is passed
The bill is passed in the house in which it was proposed
The bill is read clause by clause and each is voted upon
The bill is referred to the subcommittee, the committee makes some changes and sends it back to the house for discussion
The concerned minister proposes the need for a bill
Legislative department in ministry of law, drafts a bill

Answer: The correct sequence is:
1. The concerned minister proposes the need for a bill.
2. Legislative department in the ministry of law drafts the bill.
3. A resolution is passed to admit the bill for discussion.
4. The bill is referred to the subcommittee, the committee makes some changes and sends it back to the House for discussion.
5. The bill is read clause by clause and each is voted upon.
6. The bill is passed in the House in which it was proposed.
7. The bill is referred to the other House and is passed.
8. The bill is referred to the President of India for assent.
If the President does not sign it: for an ordinary bill, the President can return it once for reconsideration; if Parliament passes it again, with or without amendments, the President must then give assent. (For a Constitution Amendment Bill, the President has no such option to withhold assent.)

Q. How has the system of parliamentary committee affected the overseeing and appraisal of legislation by the Parliament?

Answer:
1. Parliament sits only during sessions and has very little time, so the committee system, in place since 1983 with over twenty departmentally related standing committees, has considerably lightened its burden.
2. Bills now get in-depth study in committee, alongside examining ministries’ demands for grants, departmental expenditure and cases of corruption, work that a full House meeting only during sessions could not do alone.
3. Many important bills have been referred to committees, and Parliament has approved their work with only occasional alterations.
4. The other side of this is that the real decision has effectively shifted into committees. Legally speaking, no bill can become law and no budget is sanctioned without Parliament’s own approval, but in practice Parliament rarely rejects the suggestions its committees make.
So the committee system has made legislative oversight and appraisal considerably deeper and more thorough, at the cost of Parliament’s own floor role narrowing closer to ratifying what its committees have already decided.

Q. Consider these newspaper reports and then think: what would happen if there were no legislatures? After reading each news report, state how the legislature succeeded or failed in maintaining control over the executive. (The reports: the fertilizer price rise of 28 February 2002 and its roll back on 11 March 2002; the urea and petroleum price hike walkout of 4 June 1998; the Lok Sabha suspending official business to debate Assam on 22 February 1983; Congress members protesting against atrocities on Harijans in Andhra Pradesh in March 1985.)

Answer: Without a legislature, the government could raise prices, ignore violence in a State and look away from atrocities without anyone in a position to force it to answer. Report by report:
1. 28 February and 11 March 2002: the Finance Minister, Jaswant Singh, proposed a rise of Rs. 12 in the price of a 50 kg bag of urea, and had to roll back the increases under intense opposition pressure. The legislature succeeded in controlling the executive.
2. 4 June 1998: the entire opposition staged a walkout over the hike in urea and petroleum prices, the issue rocked the House for two days, and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha had to roll back the urea price hike. Again the legislature succeeded.
3. 22 February 1983: the Lok Sabha unanimously suspended official business to give precedence to a debate on Assam, and the Home Minister sought the cooperation of all members. Here the legislature used its debating function to hold the executive to account on a national crisis, a success through discussion rather than through a vote.
4. March 1985: Congress members themselves voiced protest against atrocities on Harijans in Andhra Pradesh. Even members of the ruling party used the House to raise the problems of weaker sections, showing that the House keeps the executive under pressure from all sides.
In each case the government had a majority and still had to answer to the House. That is the legislature’s control over the executive at work.

Q. Find out the number of representatives elected from different States. Prepare a chart showing number of representatives and the population of the State according to the 2011 census.

How to do it: This is a project, so the chart is your own work. Take the number of Rajya Sabha seats of each State from the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution (the chapter gives two of them: Uttar Pradesh 31 and Sikkim 1) and the population of each State from the 2011 census. Put the States in one column, their seats in the second and their population in the third. When the chart is ready, notice the pattern the chapter explains: a more populous State gets more seats, but the seats are not in exact proportion to population, so smaller States still get at least some representation. This is the opposite of the American system, in which every state has equal seats in the Senate.

Q. I don’t understand why there is a provision for nominating these sportspersons and artists and scientists. Whom do they represent? And, do they really contribute much to the proceedings of the Rajya Sabha?

Answer: The 12 nominated members do not represent any State or any group of voters. They are nominated by the President from among persons who have made their mark in literature, science, art and social service. The idea is to bring expert knowledge into Parliament from people who could not, or would not, enter the rough and tumble of elections, the same thought Purnima Banerji expressed when she said that an Upper House could advise the Lower House through “those who could not enter into the rough and tumble of active politics”. How much they contribute depends on the individual: some nominated members have spoken often and well on their subjects, while others have attended and spoken very little. So the provision is useful in principle, but its value in practice depends on how actively the nominated members take part.

Q. (i) Do you think that composition of Rajya Sabha has protected the position of States of India?
(ii) Should indirect election of Rajya Sabha be replaced by direct elections? What would be its advantages and disadvantages?
(iii) Since 1971 census the number of seats in the Lok Sabha has not increased. Do you think that it should be increased? What should be the basis for this?

Answer:
(i) Partly. The Rajya Sabha represents the States, any matter that affects the States must be referred to it, and a State List subject cannot be moved to the Union or Concurrent List without its approval. But the chapter itself notes that experience shows the members of the Rajya Sabha represent their parties more than they represent their States, so in practice the protection is weaker than it looks on paper.
(ii) Advantages of direct election: members would be answerable to the people of the State directly, and the House would gain democratic weight. Disadvantages: the Rajya Sabha would become a copy of the Lok Sabha, the two Houses would compete for the same mandate and could deadlock more often, and the House would lose its character as the representative of the States as units. On balance, indirect election through the MLAs suits a House meant to represent the States.
(iii) There is a case for an increase, because the population has grown greatly since 1971 and each member now represents far more people. The basis should be population, so that the value of every vote stays roughly equal across constituencies. At the same time, States that controlled their population growth should not lose their share of seats, so any increase needs a balance between population and fairness to the States.

Q. The Rajya Sabha can criticise the government but cannot remove it. Can you explain why?

Answer: Because the Rajya Sabha is elected by the MLAs and not directly by the people. In the democratic form adopted by our Constitution, the people are the final authority, so the crucial powers of removing a government and controlling the finances were given to the representatives directly elected by the people, that is, to the Lok Sabha. The Council of Ministers is therefore responsible to the Lok Sabha and not to the Rajya Sabha.

Q. (R.K. Laxman’s cartoon on the passing of a bill) Is this how they follow the ‘rules of the game’?

Answer: No. In the cartoon two members settle the matter between themselves in advance, one agreeing to support the bill and the other to oppose it, so the “debate” in the House becomes a performance rather than a real discussion. The rules of law making expect a bill to be studied in committee, debated on its merits and then voted upon. When positions are fixed beforehand, the debate that should test and improve a law is lost. The cartoon is a reminder that the procedure works only if members use it honestly.

Q. From the discussion of the law making process, do you think that Parliament can devote enough time for thorough discussion of the bills? If not, then what remedies would you suggest to overcome this difficulty?

Answer: Not fully. Parliament meets only during sessions and has very limited time, sessions and time spent on debate have declined over the last two decades, and absence of quorum and boycotts waste more of it. Remedies: (1) refer every important bill to a committee, since committees can study it in depth; (2) hold longer and more regular sessions; (3) reduce disruptions, so that the time Parliament has is spent on debate; (4) give members the bill and the committee report well in advance, so that discussion in the House is informed.

Q. With so many sting operations are MPs still free to speak anything anywhere?

Answer: No. Parliamentary privilege means that no action can be taken against a member for whatever the member may have said in the legislature. It protects speech inside the House, so that members can represent the people and control the executive without fear. It is not a licence to say or do anything anywhere: what a member says or does outside the House is under the ordinary law like any other citizen’s, and the House itself can act against a member who misuses its proceedings, the presiding officer having the final power in matters of breach of privilege.

Q. Watch the Doordarshan telecast of Parliament sessions for three continuous days. Or collect the newspaper reports for three continuous days and make a wallpaper. Take care to observe the issues being discussed, the role of the speaker, questions being asked, the political parties of the representatives, representatives from your region, nature of the issues of discussion, whether they were all of national or regional in character.

How to do it: Make one column for each day. Under each, note the main issues taken up, how the Speaker (or the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha) kept order, two or three questions asked during Question Hour and which ministers answered them, the parties of the members who spoke, and anything raised by members from your own region. Finally sort the issues into national and regional ones. The wallpaper should show the functions this chapter describes: control of the executive through questions, the debating function and representation of different regions.

Q. Walkout is a frequently adopted measure by the opposition to register their protest against the government. Has there been an overuse of that weapon?

Answer: To an extent, yes. A walkout is a legitimate political technique, and the chapter accepts that such actions are often used to gain concessions from the government and so force executive accountability. But when walkouts and boycotts become routine, they deprive the House of the very power it has to control the executive through discussion, waste legislative time and leave bills to be passed without the opposition’s scrutiny. A walkout works best as a rare signal of strong protest, not as a regular substitute for debate.

Q. “We are not walking out, we have been ordered out,” said the MPs. Why do you think such situations occur?

Answer: Such situations occur when members break the rules of the House, for example by shouting, rushing to the well of the House or refusing to let proceedings go on. The presiding officer is the final authority in regulating the business of the House, and to keep debate meaningful and orderly and protect the dignity of the House, the presiding officer can order such members out. They happen more often when debates on sensitive issues become heated and members use disruption as a political technique.

Q. I don’t understand why they change parties. Do they even come back to the party they once left?

Answer: Members may change parties because they disagree with their party, because they are offered a position such as ministership, or for personal gain. This is why the anti-defection amendment (52nd Amendment, 1985) disqualifies a member who voluntarily leaves the party, votes against its instructions or stays absent when asked to be present. And yes, members sometimes do return to the party they left, which shows that defection is often about positions and bargaining rather than principle. The chapter’s verdict is that the law has not been able to curb defections, but it has given more power to party leaders and presiding officers over the members.