Class 12 Political Science Book 2 Chapter 7 Regional Aspirations Important Questions with Answers in English

Q. What does the chapter mean by Kashmiriyat?

Answer: It is the name the chapter gives to the regional aspiration of the people of the state, who thought of themselves as Kashmiris above all rather than as belonging to India or Pakistan.

Q. Who was Maharaja Hari Singh, and what did he sign with the Government of India in 1947?

Answer: He was the ruler of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, who wanted an independent status for his state; when Pakistan sent tribal infiltrators in October 1947 he asked for Indian military help and signed an ‘Instrument of Accession’ with the Government of India.

Q. What does the chapter call the part of the State that came under Pakistani control after the 1947 invasion?

Answer: It calls it Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK), and describes it as Indian territory which is under illegal occupation of Pakistan.

Q. On what date was Article 370 abolished, and by which Act?

Answer: On 5 August 2019, by the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019, which also constituted the state into two Union Territories, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.

Q. What was the ‘Punjabi suba’, and which organisation led the movement for it?

Answer: It was the demand for a Punjabi speaking State, led by the Akali Dal, which had been formed in 1920 as the political wing of the Sikhs; the State was finally created in 1966.

Q. How does the chapter gloss the two words qaum and bolbala used in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution?

Answer: It glosses qaum as community or nation, and bolbala as dominance or hegemony.

Q. What was ‘Operation Blue Star’?

Answer: It was the code name for the army action carried out by the Government of India in the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984.

Q. Which States does the chapter call “the seven sisters”, and which State does it call the ‘Brother’?

Answer: The seven sisters are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Meghalaya; Sikkim, added to the list later, is referred to as the ‘Brother’ to those seven states.

Q. What did it mean that Sikkim was a ‘protectorate’ of India at the time of independence?

Answer: It meant that while Sikkim was not a part of India, it was also not a fully sovereign country: its defence and foreign relations were looked after by India, while the power of internal administration was with the Chogyal, Sikkim’s monarch.

Q. What was Goa’s status after its liberation in 1961, and when did it become a State?

Answer: Goa, Diu and Daman became a Union Territory in December 1961, and Goa finally became a State of the Indian Union in 1987.

Q. How does the chapter contrast the Indian approach to cultural diversity with the approach adopted in many European countries?

Answer: The chapter says the basic principle of the Indian approach was that the Indian nation shall not deny the rights of different regions and linguistic groups to retain their own culture, so that the nation would not mean the negation of the region. It calls this very different from the approach adopted in many European countries, where cultural diversity was seen as a threat to the nation. India instead adopted a democratic approach, in which the political expression of regional aspirations is not looked upon as anti-national.

Q. Name the three social and political regions of Jammu and Kashmir and give one fact the chapter states about each.

Answer: Jammu, a mix of foothills and plains, predominantly inhabited by Hindus, with Muslims, Sikhs and people of other denominations also resident. Kashmir, which mainly comprises the Kashmir valley and is inhabited mostly by Kashmiri Muslims, the remaining being Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and others. Ladakh, which is mainly mountainous and has very little population, almost equally divided between Buddhists and Muslims.

Q. What three steps did the United Nations Organisation recommend in its resolution dated 21 April 1948, and what came of them?

Answer: Firstly, Pakistan had to withdraw its entire nationalities who entered into Kashmir. Secondly, India needed to progressively reduce its forces so as to maintain law and order. Thirdly, a plebiscite was to be conducted in a free and impartial manner. The chapter adds that no progress could be achieved under this resolution.

Q. What change was made in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965, and who was the first person to hold the new office?

Answer: A change was made by which the Prime Minister of the state was designated as Chief Minister of the state. Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq of the Indian National Congress accordingly became the first Chief Minister of the state. Before this, the head of the government in the State had been called Prime Minister, an arrangement that dated from March 1948 when Sheikh Abdullah took over.

Q. The chapter opens with a poster from the Uttarakhand movement. What does its caption say the poster shows?

Answer: The caption says regional aspirations are usually expressed in the language of the region and addressed to the local population or the rulers, but that this unusual poster appeals to all the Indian citizens in seven different languages. It says the poster thus underscores the compatibility of the regional aspirations with nationalist sentiments.

Q. What does the extract from the Justice Nanavati Commission of Inquiry, Report, Vol. I, 2005 say about the violence of 31 October 1984?

Answer: The extract says there is evidence to show that on 31-10-84 either meetings were held or persons who could organise attacks were contacted and were given instructions to kill Sikhs and loot their houses and shops. It adds that the attacks were made in a systematic manner and without much fear of the police, almost suggesting that those who made them were assured that they would not be harmed while committing those acts or even after.

Q. Why does the chapter treat the great famine of 1959 as a turning point in the Mizo movement?

Answer: Some Mizos already believed that they were never a part of British India and therefore did not belong to the Indian union, but the chapter says the movement for secession gained popular support only after the Assam government failed to respond adequately to the great famine of 1959 in the Mizo hills. The Mizos’ anger at this led to the formation of the Mizo National Front under the leadership of Laldenga.

Q. What was the special ‘opinion poll’ held in Goa in January 1967, and what was its result?

Answer: The Maharashtrawadi Gomanatak Party wanted Goa, as a Marathi speaking area, to merge with Maharashtra, while the United Goan Party led those keen to retain a separate Goan identity and culture, particularly the Konkani language. In January 1967 the Central Government held a special ‘opinion poll’, a referendum-like procedure, asking people to decide if they wanted to be part of Maharashtra or remain separate. The majority voted in favour of remaining outside Maharashtra, and Goa continued as a Union Territory.

Q. Trace the political history of Jammu and Kashmir from the 2002 election to 5 August 2019, as the chapter gives it.

Answer: In 2002 the National Conference failed to win a majority and was replaced by a coalition government of the People’s Democratic Party and the Congress. As per the coalition agreement Mufti Mohammed headed the government for the first three years, succeeded by Ghulam Nabi Azad of the Indian National Congress, who could not complete the term because President’s rule was imposed in July 2008. The next election was held in November-December 2008, and another coalition government of the National Conference and the Congress came into power headed by Omar Abdullah in 2009, though the state continued to witness disturbances led by the Hurriyat Conference. In 2014 the state went into another election, which recorded the highest voters’ turnout in 25 years, and a coalition government led by Mufti Mohammed Sayeed of the PDP came into power with the BJP as its partner. After Mufti Mohammed Sayeed died, his daughter Mahbooba Mufti became the first woman Chief Minister of the state in April 2016; during her tenure major acts of terrorism and mounting external and internal tensions were witnessed. President’s rule was imposed in June 2018 after the BJP withdrew its support to the Mufti government. On 5 August 2019, Article 370 was abolished by the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 and the state was constituted into two Union Territories, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.

Q. What were the main provisions of the Rajiv Gandhi-Longowal Accord of July 1985?

Answer: After coming to power following the election in 1984, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi initiated a dialogue with moderate Akali leaders, and in July 1985 reached an agreement with Harchand Singh Longowal, then the President of the Akali Dal. Under it, it was agreed that Chandigarh would be transferred to Punjab; that a separate commission would be appointed to resolve the border dispute between Punjab and Haryana; and that a tribunal would be set up to decide the sharing of Ravi-Beas river water among Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. The agreement also provided for compensation to and better treatment of those affected by the militancy in Punjab, and for the withdrawal of the application of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Punjab. The chapter describes the accord as a step towards bringing normalcy to Punjab.

Q. Describe the Dravidian movement as the chapter presents it: its slogan, its methods, its organisations and its outcome.

Answer: The chapter calls it one of India’s most effective regional movements and one of the first regional movements in Indian politics, and gives its popular slogan, ‘Vadakku Vaazhgiradhu; Therkku Thaeikiradhu’, translated as the north thrives even as the south decays. Though some sections had ambitions of creating a Dravida nation, the movement did not take to arms; it used democratic means like public debates and the electoral platform. It led to the formation of the Dravidar Kazhagam under E.V. Ramasami ‘Periyar’, which opposed the Brahmins’ dominance and affirmed regional pride against the political, economic and cultural domination of the North; lack of support from other States limited it to Tamil Nadu. The DK split and its political legacy passed to the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which made its entry into politics with a three pronged agitation in 1953-54 and came to power in the Assembly elections of 1967. After the split that followed C. Annadurai’s death there were two parties claiming the Dravidian legacy, the DMK and the AIADMK, and since 1996 one of them has been a part of the ruling coalition at the Centre. The chapter concludes that regional politics in Tamil Nadu, initially seen as a threat to Indian nationalism, is a good example of the compatibility of regionalism and nationalism.

Q. The chapter says a comparison of the Mizoram and Nagaland cases offers a lesson in democratic politics. Compare the two.

Answer: Both began as demands for a separate country rather than for autonomy. In Mizoram the movement for secession gained popular support after the Assam government failed to respond adequately to the great famine of 1959, the Mizo National Front was formed under Laldenga, and from 1966 it fought a two decade guerilla war with support from the Pakistani government and shelter in the then East Pakistan, met by repressive measures in which the common people were the victims. At the end of two decades, the chapter says, everyone was a loser, and the maturity of the political leadership at both ends made the difference: Laldenga came back from exile and Rajiv Gandhi steered the negotiations to a positive conclusion, so that in 1986 a peace agreement was signed under which Mizoram was granted full-fledged statehood with special powers, the MNF gave up the secessionist struggle and Laldenga took over as Chief Minister. Mizoram is today one of the most peaceful places in the region. The Naga story is similar except that it started much earlier and has not yet had such a happy ending: led by Angami Zapu Phizo a section of the Nagas declared independence in 1951, Phizo turned down many offers of negotiated settlement, and although a section of the Nagas later signed an agreement with the government of India this was not acceptable to other rebels, so the problem in Nagaland still awaits a final resolution.

Q. How were the demands for autonomy in the North-East met, both by reorganisation and by other provisions of the federal set up?

Answer: At independence the entire region except Manipur and Tripura comprised the State of Assam, and demands for political autonomy arose when the non-Assamese felt that the Assam government was imposing Assamese language on them. There were opposition and protest riots throughout the State, and leaders of the major tribal communities wanted to separate from Assam. They formed the Eastern India Tribal Union, which later transformed into the more comprehensive All Party Hill Leaders Conference in 1960, and demanded a tribal State to be carved out of Assam. Instead of one tribal State, several States were carved out: at different points of time the Central Government had to create Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh out of Assam, and Tripura and Manipur were upgraded into States too. The reorganisation was completed by 1972, but autonomy demands did not end: in Assam communities like the Bodos, Karbis and Dimasas wanted separate States, and often the same area was claimed by more than one community. Since it was not possible to go on making smaller and yet smaller States, other provisions of the federal set up were used instead, so that the Karbis and Dimasas were granted autonomy under District Councils while the Bodos were granted an Autonomous Council.

Q. Describe how Sikkim became a State of the Indian union.

Answer: At the time of independence Sikkim was a ‘protectorate’ of India: not a part of India, but also not a fully sovereign country, with its defence and foreign relations looked after by India and internal administration with the Chogyal, Sikkim’s monarch. The arrangement ran into difficulty as the Chogyal was unable to deal with the democratic aspirations of the people. An overwhelming majority of Sikkim’s population was Nepali, but the Chogyal was seen as perpetuating the rule of a small elite from the minority Lepcha-Bhutia community, and the anti-Chogyal leaders of both communities sought and got support from the government of India. The first democratic elections to the Sikkim assembly in 1974 were swept by Sikkim Congress, which stood for greater integration with India. The assembly first sought the status of ‘associate state’ and then in April 1975 passed a resolution asking for full integration with India, followed by a hurriedly organised referendum that put a stamp of popular approval on the request. The Indian Parliament accepted it immediately and Sikkim became the 22nd State of the Indian union. The Chogyal did not accept this merger and his supporters accused the government of India of foul play and use of force, yet the merger enjoyed popular support and did not become a divisive issue in Sikkim’s politics.

Q. Explain the internal divisions of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the two opposite reactions its special status provoked, and how its status changed in 2019.

Answer: The chapter says Jammu and Kashmir comprises three social and political regions. Jammu is a mix of foothills and plains, predominantly inhabited by Hindus, with Muslims, Sikhs and people of other denominations also resident. The Kashmir region mainly comprises the Kashmir valley and is inhabited mostly by Kashmiri Muslims, the remaining being Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and others. Ladakh is mainly mountainous, with very little population, almost equally divided between Buddhists and Muslims. Because the three regions differ in this way, the aspirations expressed within the State are themselves multiple rather than single.

The special status conferred by Article 370 provoked two opposite reactions. There was a section of people outside of J&K that believed the special status did not allow full integration of the State with India, and felt that Article 370 be revoked and J&K be treated like any other state of India. Another section, mostly Kashmiris, believed that the autonomy conferred by Article 370 was not enough, and had at least three major grievances: that the promise that Accession would be referred to the people of the State after the situation created by the tribal invasion was normalised had not been fulfilled, which generated the demand for a plebiscite; that the special federal status guaranteed by Article 370 had been eroded in practice, which led to the demand for restoration of autonomy or ‘Greater State Autonomy’; and that democracy as practiced in the rest of India had not been similarly institutionalised in the State.

The chapter records that on 5 August 2019 Article 370 was abolished by the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 and the state was constituted into two Union Territories, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. It adds that both are living examples of plural society in India, with diversities of all kind, religious, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and tribal, and also divergent political and developmental aspirations, which have been sought to be achieved by the latest Act.

Q. Trace the course of the Punjab problem from the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 to the return of peace in the middle of the 1990s.

Answer: During the 1970s a section of Akalis began to demand political autonomy for the region, which was reflected in a resolution passed at their conference at Anandpur Sahib in 1973. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution asserted regional autonomy, wanted to redefine centre-state relationship in the country, spoke of the aspirations of the Sikh qaum, glossed by the chapter as community or nation, and declared its goal as attaining the bolbala, dominance or hegemony, of the Sikhs. The chapter calls the Resolution a plea for strengthening federalism in India, and notes that it had a limited appeal among the Sikh masses.

After the Akali government was dismissed in 1980, the Akali Dal launched a movement on the question of the distribution of water between Punjab and its neighbouring States, and a section of the religious leaders raised the question of autonomous Sikh identity. Soon the leadership of the movement passed from the moderate Akalis to the extremist elements and took the form of armed insurgency; these militants made their headquarters inside the Golden Temple in Amritsar and turned it into an armed fortress. In June 1984 the Government of India carried out ‘Operation Blue Star’, code name for army action in the Golden Temple. The government could successfully flush out the militants, but the operation also damaged the historic temple and deeply hurt the sentiments of the Sikhs, and a large proportion of Sikhs in India and abroad saw it as an attack on their faith, which gave further impetus to militant and extremist groups.

On 31 October 1984 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated outside her residence by her bodyguards, both of whom were Sikhs and wanted to take revenge for Operation Blue Star. Violence broke out against the Sikh community in Delhi and many parts of northern India and continued for almost a week; more than two thousand Sikhs were killed in the national capital, the worst affected area, and hundreds elsewhere, especially in places like Kanpur, Bokaro and Chas. The chapter says what hurt the Sikhs most was that the government took a long time in restoring normalcy and that the perpetrators of this violence were not effectively punished. Twenty years later, speaking in Parliament in 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed regret over these killings and apologised to the nation.

Rajiv Gandhi then initiated a dialogue with moderate Akali leaders and in July 1985 reached the Rajiv Gandhi-Longowal Accord, or Punjab Accord, with Harchand Singh Longowal. Peace did not come easily or immediately: the cycle of violence continued nearly for a decade, militancy and counter insurgency violence led to excesses by the police and violations of human rights, the Akali Dal fragmented, President’s rule had to be imposed and the normal electoral and political process was suspended, and when elections were held in 1992 only 24 per cent of the electors turned out to vote. Militancy was eventually eradicated by the security forces, but the losses incurred by the people of Punjab, Sikhs and Hindus alike, were enormous. Peace returned to Punjab by the middle of the 1990s, and the alliance of Akali Dal (Badal) and the BJP scored a major victory in 1997 in the first normal elections in the post-militancy era.

Q. “The Assam movement was a combination of cultural pride and economic backwardness.” Explain.

Answer: The cultural side of the movement came from the fear of being outnumbered in one’s own home. The large scale migration into the North-East pitted the ‘local’ communities against people who were seen as ‘outsiders’ or migrants, latecomers from India or abroad who were seen as encroachers on scarce resources like land and potential competitors to employment opportunities and political power. In Assam the Assamese suspected that there were huge numbers of illegal Bengali Muslim settlers from Bangladesh, and felt that unless these foreign nationals were detected and deported they would reduce the indigenous Assamese into a minority. The movement was therefore directed against illegal migrations, against the domination of Bengalis and other outsiders, and against a faulty voters’ register that included the names of lakhs of immigrants, and it demanded that all outsiders who had entered the State after 1951 should be sent back.

The economic side came from the sense of a rich State whose people stayed poor. There was widespread poverty and unemployment in Assam despite the existence of natural resources like oil, tea and coal, and it was felt that these were drained out of the State without any commensurate benefit to the people. This is why the movement tried to blockade the movement of trains and the supply of oil from Assam to refineries in Bihar.

The two sides together are what gave the movement its reach. From 1979 the All Assam Students’ Union, a students’ group not affiliated to any party, led the anti-foreigner movement; the agitation followed many novel methods and mobilised all sections of Assamese people, drawing support across the State, though it also involved many tragic and violent incidents leading to loss of property and human lives. Eventually, after six years of turmoil, the Rajiv Gandhi-led government entered into negotiations with the AASU leaders, leading to the signing of an accord in 1985 under which those foreigners who migrated into Assam during and after the Bangladesh war and since were to be identified and deported. With the successful completion of the movement, the AASU and the Asom Gana Sangram Parishad organised themselves as a regional political party called Asom Gana Parishad, which came to power in 1985 with the promise of resolving the foreign national problem as well as building a ‘Golden Assam’. The chapter adds that the accord brought peace and changed the face of politics in Assam, but did not solve the problem of immigration, which continues to be a live issue there and elsewhere in the North-East, and is particularly acute in Tripura, where the original inhabitants have been reduced to being a minority in their own land.

Q. What five lessons does the chapter draw in its closing section, ‘Accommodation and National Integration’?

Answer: First, that regional aspirations are very much a part of democratic politics, and that the expression of regional issues is not an aberration or an abnormal phenomenon. The chapter points out that even in smaller countries like the United Kingdom there are regional aspirations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, that Spain faces a secessionist movement from the Basques and Sri Lanka from the Tamils, and that a large and diverse democracy like India must deal with regional aspirations on a regular basis, because nation building is an ongoing process.

Second, that the best way to respond to regional aspirations is through democratic negotiations rather than through suppression. In the eighties militancy had erupted in Punjab, problems were persisting in the North-East, students in Assam were agitating and the Kashmir valley was on the boil; instead of treating these as simple law and order problems, the Government of India reached negotiated settlements with regional movements, which produced a reconciliation that reduced tensions in many regions. The example of Mizoram shows how political settlement can resolve the problem of separatism effectively.

Third, the significance of power sharing. A formal democratic structure is not sufficient by itself: groups and parties from the region need to be given a share in power at the State level, and since the regions together form the nation, the regions must also have a share in deciding the destiny of the nation. If regions are not given a share in national level decision making, the feeling of injustice and alienation can spread.

Fourth, that regional imbalance in economic development contributes to the feeling of regional discrimination. Regional imbalance is a fact of India’s development experience, and backward states or backward regions naturally feel that their backwardness should be addressed on a priority basis and that the policies of the Indian government have caused this imbalance. If some states remain poor while others develop rapidly, it leads to regional imbalances and inter-regional migrations.

Fifth, that these cases make us appreciate the farsightedness of the makers of the Constitution in dealing with questions of diversity. The federal system adopted by India is a flexible arrangement: while most of the states have equal powers, there are special provisions for some states like J&K and the states in the North-East, though the chapter notes that Article 370, which contained special provisions for J&K, was abrogated in August 2019. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution allows different tribes complete autonomy of preserving their practices and customary laws, and these provisions proved crucial in resolving some very complex political problems in the North-East. What distinguishes India from many other countries facing similar challenges, the chapter concludes, is that its constitutional framework is much more flexible and accommodative, so that regional aspirations are not encouraged to espouse separatism, and politics in India has succeeded in accepting regionalism as part and parcel of democratic politics.

Q. Write short notes on any six of the leaders whose profiles the chapter carries, using the details the chapter itself gives.

Answer: Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah (1905-1982): leader of Jammu and Kashmir; proponent of autonomy and secularism for Jammu and Kashmir; led the popular struggle against princely rule; opposed to Pakistan due to its non-secular character; leader of the National Conference; Prime Minister of J&K immediately after its accession with India in 1947; dismissed and jailed by the Government of India from 1953 to 1964 and again from 1965 to 1968; became Chief Minister of the State after an agreement with Indira Gandhi in 1974.

E.V. Ramasami Naicker (1879-1973): known as Periyar, the respected; strong supporter of atheism; famous for his anti-caste struggle and rediscovery of Dravidian identity; initially a worker of the Congress party; started the self-respect movement in 1925; led the anti-Brahmin movement; worked for the Justice party and later founded Dravidar Kazhagam; opposed to Hindi and domination of north India; propounded the thesis that north Indians and Brahmins are Aryans.

Master Tara Singh (1885-1967): prominent Sikh religious and political leader; one of the early leaders of the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee; leader of the Akali movement; supporter of the freedom movement but opposed to the Congress’ policy of negotiating only with the Muslims; after Independence, the senior most advocate of the formation of a separate Punjab State.

Sant Harchand Singh Longowal (1932-1985): Sikh political and religious leader; began his political career in the mid-sixties as an Akali leader; became president of the Akali Dal in 1980; reached an agreement with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on key demands of the Akalis; assassinated by unidentified Sikh youth.

Laldenga (1937-1990): founder and leader of the Mizo National Front; turned into a rebel after the experience of the famine in 1959; led an armed struggle against India for two decades; reached a settlement and signed an agreement with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1986; became the chief minister of the newly created State of Mizoram.

Angami Zapu Phizo (1904-1990): leader of the movement for independent Nagaland; president of the Naga National Council; began an armed struggle against the Indian state; went ‘underground’, stayed in Pakistan and spent the last three decades of his life in exile in UK.

Kazi Lhendup Dorji Khangsarpa (1904): leader of the democracy movement in Sikkim; founder of Sikkim Praja Mandal and later leader of the Sikkim State Congress; founded the Sikkim National Congress in 1962; after an electoral victory he led the movement for integration of Sikkim with India, and after the integration the Sikkim Congress merged with the Indian National Congress.

Rajiv Gandhi (1944-1991): Prime Minister of India between 1984 and 1989; son of Indira Gandhi; joined active politics after 1980; reached agreements with militants in Punjab, Mizoram and the students’ union in Assam; pressed for a more open economy and computer technology; sent an Indian Army contingent on the request of the Sri Lankan government to sort out the Sinhala-Tamil conflict; assassinated by a suspected LTTE suicide bomber.

Q. “All regional movements need not lead to separatist demands.” Explain with examples from this chapter, and say whether regional demands exemplify the principle of unity with diversity.

Answer: The chapter’s own examples show that a regional movement can stay entirely inside the democratic system. The Dravidian movement is the clearest: though some sections of it had ambitions of creating a Dravida nation, the movement did not take to arms, and instead used democratic means like public debates and the electoral platform, so that it acquired political power in the State and became influential at the national level; the chapter calls regional politics in Tamil Nadu, initially seen as a threat to Indian nationalism, a good example of the compatibility of regionalism and nationalism. The movement for a ‘Punjabi suba’ was another such demand, met by the creation of Punjab and Haryana in 1966, as were the mass agitations for linguistic States that shaped today’s Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Gujarat, and the later creation of Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand. In the North-East, the autonomy demands of the Karbis, Dimasas and Bodos were met inside Assam through District Councils and an Autonomous Council rather than by separation. Sikkim’s case runs the other way and makes the same point: there a popular movement asked for full integration with India, and Sikkim became the 22nd State.

Even where movements did begin as separatist demands, they did not have to end that way. Mizoram is the chapter’s own proof: after two decades of insurgency the 1986 accord granted Mizoram full-fledged statehood with special powers, the MNF gave up the secessionist struggle, and Mizoram is today one of the most peaceful places in the region.

On the second question, the chapter’s answer is that regional demands do exemplify unity with diversity, because of how the Indian system is built to receive them. The basic principle of the Indian approach was that the nation shall not deny the rights of different regions and linguistic groups to retain their own culture, so that the nation would not mean the negation of the region. Democracy allows the political expression of regional aspirations and does not look upon them as anti-national, and the federal system is a flexible arrangement, with special provisions for some states and a Sixth Schedule that allows different tribes complete autonomy in preserving their practices and customary laws. The chapter concludes that what distinguishes India from many other countries facing similar challenges is that its constitutional framework is much more flexible and accommodative, and that therefore regional aspirations are not encouraged to espouse separatism. It also warns, in its own voice, that this is not automatic: power sharing at the State and national level matters, and regional imbalance in economic development contributes to the feeling of regional discrimination.