Class 12 Political Science Book 2 Chapter 7 Regional Aspirations NCERT Solutions

Q. Match the following.

A: Nature of regional aspirations
(a) Socio-religious identity leading to statehood
(b) Linguistic identity and tensions with Centre
(c) Regional imbalance leading to demand for Statehood
(d) Secessionist demands on account of tribal identity

B: States
i. Nagaland /Mizoram
ii. Jharkhand /Chattisgarh
iii. Punjab
iv. Tamil Nadu

Answer: (a) – iii  ·  (b) – iv  ·  (c) – ii
 ·  (d) – i

(a) Socio-religious identity leading to statehood – iii. Punjab. The Akali Dal was
formed in 1920 as the political wing of the Sikhs and led the movement for a
‘Punjabi suba’. The demand rested on a religious community’s identity as
much as on language, and it ended in statehood: Punjab and Haryana were created in 1966, and
“The Sikhs were now a majority in the truncated State of Punjab.”

(b) Linguistic identity and tensions with Centre – iv. Tamil Nadu. The Dravidian
movement affirmed regional pride against the political, economic and cultural domination of the
North, and its most famous agitation was against making Hindi the country’s official language.
The chapter notes that “The success of the anti-Hindi agitation of 1965 added to the
DMK’s popularity”, and that the Dravidian parties have dominated the politics of the
State ever since 1967.

(c) Regional imbalance leading to demand for Statehood – ii. Jharkhand /Chattisgarh.
These are the States the chapter names in its list of boundaries redrawn to meet the challenge of
diversity: “Later, the States of Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand were
created.” Their demand came from the backwardness of the regions concerned rather than from
language or religion, which is what the fourth lesson of the closing section calls regional imbalance
in economic development.

(d) Secessionist demands on account of tribal identity – i. Nagaland /Mizoram. These
are the chapter’s own two examples of movements that demanded a separate country. A section of
the Nagas under Angami Zapu Phizo declared independence in 1951, and the Mizo National Front under
Laldenga started an armed campaign for independence in 1966.

Q. Regional aspirations of the people of North-East get expressed in different ways. These
include movements against outsiders, movement for greater autonomy and movement for separate
national existence. On the map of the North-East, using different shades for these three, show the
States where these expressions are prominently found.

Answer. The chapter itself says that “Three issues dominate the politics of
North-East: demands for autonomy, movements for secession, and opposition to
‘outsiders’.” Here is every State the chapter names under each of the three,
with the sentence it names them in. Use one shade per row when you shade the outline map in the exam.

The point the question is really testing: that the three expressions are not
alternatives. Assam, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura appear in more than one row, because the same State can carry
an autonomy demand, an anti-outsider movement and, at some point, a secessionist movement at the
same time.

Q. What were the main provisions of the Punjab accord? In what way can they be the basis
for further tensions between the Punjab and its neighbouring States?

Answer. After coming to power following the election in 1984, Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi initiated a dialogue with moderate Akali leaders, and in July 1985 reached an
agreement with Harchand Singh Longowal, then the President of the Akali Dal. This agreement is
known as the Rajiv Gandhi – Longowal Accord or the Punjab Accord, and the chapter calls
it “a step towards bringing normalcy to Punjab”.

Its main provisions were four.

1. Chandigarh would be transferred to Punjab.
2. A separate commission would be appointed to resolve the border dispute between Punjab
   and Haryana.
3. A tribunal would be set up to decide the sharing of Ravi-Beas river water among
   Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.
4. The agreement also provided for compensation to and better treatment of those affected by
   the militancy in Punjab, and for the withdrawal of the application of the Armed Forces
   Special Powers Act in Punjab.

How they can be the basis for further tensions. Three of the four provisions concern
something that Punjab does not hold alone, so each of them settles a question for Punjab by
unsettling it for a neighbour.

• Chandigarh. The city serves as the capital of both Punjab and Haryana. Transferring it
  to Punjab decides the matter in Punjab’s favour and leaves Haryana’s claim open, so the
  transfer itself becomes a standing dispute rather than a settlement.
• The Punjab-Haryana border. The accord did not settle the border; it only promised a
  commission to look at it. Until that commission reports and its report is accepted by both sides,
  the dispute stays alive, and either side can read the delay as bad faith.
• Ravi-Beas river water. This is the clearest case. The accord names three States,
  Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan, as sharers of the same water, and refers the sharing to a tribunal
  rather than deciding it. River water is a fixed quantity: what one State gains another loses.
  Recall too that the movement that preceded the accord was itself launched on this issue, since
  after the Akali government was dismissed in 1980 “the Akali Dal launched a movement on the
  question of the distribution of water between Punjab and its neighbouring States.” An
  accord that hands the same question to a tribunal has postponed the conflict rather than removed
  it.

The chapter’s own verdict on the accord: “However, peace did not come easily
or immediately. The cycle of violence continued nearly for a decade.” The Akali Dal
fragmented, President’s rule had to be imposed, and when elections were finally held in 1992
only 24 per cent of the electors turned out to vote.

Q. Why did the Anandpur Sahib Resolution become controversial?

Answer. The Resolution was passed at an Akali conference at Anandpur Sahib in 1973,
when, during the 1970s, a section of Akalis began to demand political autonomy for the region. It
became controversial for three reasons that follow from what it actually said.

1. It asked for a redrawing of centre-state relations. The Resolution “asserted
   regional autonomy and wanted to redefine centre-state relationship in the country”. A
   demand pitched at the whole constitutional relationship, and not at one specific grievance, is
   always read at the Centre as a challenge to the Union rather than as a request within it, even
   though the chapter itself describes the Resolution as “a plea for strengthening federalism
   in India”.
2. Its language could be read in two ways. The Resolution “spoke of the
   aspirations of the Sikh qaum (community or nation) and declared its goal as attaining the bolbala
   (dominance or hegemony) of the Sikhs”. The chapter is careful to give both meanings of
   each word. Qaum can mean community, which is unremarkable, or nation, which is not;
   bolbala can mean dominance, or hegemony. A document that can be read either as a claim for
   a community’s standing or as a claim for a separate nation is bound to be contested, and it
   was later used by extremist elements to support their own case.
3. It did not carry the community with it. The chapter adds plainly that “The
   Resolution had a limited appeal among the Sikh masses.” A demand made in the name of a
   whole qaum that the qaum itself had not broadly endorsed was open to challenge on
   that ground alone, from within the community as well as from outside it.

The chapter notes what followed: a few years later, after the Akali government had been dismissed
in 1980, the Akali Dal launched a movement on the distribution of water between Punjab and its
neighbouring States, and “A section of the religious leaders raised the question of
autonomous Sikh identity.” Soon after that the leadership of the movement passed from the
moderate Akalis to the extremist elements.

Q. Explain the internal divisions of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and describe how these
lead to multiple regional aspirations in that State.

Answer. The chapter says that “Jammu and Kashmir comprises three social and
political regions — Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.” They differ in land, in population
and in religion.

How these divisions produce multiple aspirations.

• Because the three regions are unlike one another, no single demand can speak for the whole
  State. What satisfies one region is not what the next region is asking for, so aspirations
  within J&K are plural by construction rather than by accident.
• Within the Kashmir valley the chapter records the aspiration it calls
  Kashmiriyat: the people of the state “thought of themselves as Kashmiris above
  all”, and did not accept the Pakistani leaders’ claim that Kashmir
  ‘belonged’ to Pakistan because the majority population was Muslim.
• The special status under Article 370 itself provoked two opposite reactions. A section
  of people outside J&K believed the special status “did not allow full
  integration of the State with India” and felt Article 370 should be revoked. Another
  section, mostly Kashmiris, believed that “the autonomy conferred by Article 370 is
  not enough”.
• That second section had at least three major grievances, and each produced a demand of
  its own: the unfulfilled promise that Accession would be referred to the people of the State
  “generated the demand for a plebiscite”; the feeling that the special federal
  status had been eroded in practice “led to the demand for restoration of autonomy or
  ‘Greater State Autonomy’”; and it was felt that democracy as practiced in the
  rest of India had not been similarly institutionalised in the State.
• There is also an external dimension that keeps the internal question open: Pakistan has
  always claimed the Kashmir valley, one part of the State came under Pakistani control after the
  1947 invasion, and the chapter calls this Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK),
  describing it as Indian territory under illegal occupation.

Where the chapter ends. On 5 August 2019 Article 370 was abolished by the
Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 and the state was constituted into two Union
Territories, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. The chapter closes by calling both “living
examples of plural society in India”, with diversities of all kind, religious, cultural,
linguistic, ethnic and tribal, and also “divergent political and developmental
aspirations, which have been sought to be achieved by the latest Act”. That last sentence
is the chapter’s own way of saying that the plurality of aspirations is what the reorganisation
was addressed to.

Q. What are the various positions on the issue of regional autonomy for Kashmir? Which of
these do you think are justifiable? Give reasons for your answer.

Part one: the positions, as the chapter records them. This half is factual and carries most
of the marks. The chapter sets out the following.

1. That the special status was too much. “There is a section of people outside of
   J&K that believed that the special status of the State conferred by Article 370 did not allow
   full integration of the State with India. This section felt that Article 370 be revoked and J&K
   be treated like any other state of India.”
2. That the special status was not enough. “Another section, mostly Kashmiris,
   believe that the autonomy conferred by Article 370 is not enough.” Within this position
   the chapter lists three distinct demands: a plebiscite, arising from the unfulfilled promise
   that Accession would be referred to the people; restoration of autonomy or ‘Greater State
   Autonomy’, arising from the feeling that the federal status had been eroded in practice;
   and the fuller institutionalisation of democracy in the State on the same terms as the rest
   of India.
3. The demand for a separate Kashmiri nation. By 1989 the State “had come in the
   grip of a militant movement mobilised around the cause of a separate Kashmiri nation”,
   and the chapter records that “The insurgents got moral, material and military support from
   Pakistan.”
4. Regional autonomy pursued through the ballot. In 1996 the National Conference led by
   Farooq Abdullah came to power “with a demand for regional autonomy for Jammu and
   Kashmir”, that is, the same demand pressed through an elected government rather than
   outside the system.
5. Pakistan’s claim. Externally, “Pakistan has always claimed that Kashmir
   valley should be part of Pakistan.”

Part two: your own view. The question asks what you think, so the examiner is
marking the reasons, not the conclusion. Argue from the chapter, and it gives you a clear test to
argue from: its second lesson is that “the best way to respond to regional aspirations is
through democratic negotiations rather than through suppression”, and its third is
“the significance of power sharing”.

A model answer using that test runs as follows. Any position that is pressed through democratic
means is justifiable on the chapter’s own reasoning, whichever direction it points in.
That covers the demand for greater autonomy pressed through an elected government, as the National
Conference did in 1996, and equally the argument for fuller integration, since “Democracy
allows the political expressions of regional aspirations and does not look upon them as
anti-national.” The demand for the fuller institutionalisation of democracy in the State is
the easiest of all to justify, since it asks only for what citizens elsewhere in India already
have.

What the chapter’s reasoning does not support is the pursuit of any position
by arms. Its own account of what that produced is the answer: for a number of years the State
was under President’s rule and effectively under the control of the armed forces, and
throughout the period from 1990 Jammu and Kashmir “experienced extraordinary violence at the
hands of the insurgents and through army action”. Compare the alternative the chapter holds
up: “The example of Mizoram shows how political settlement can resolve the problem of
separatism effectively.”

Q. The Assam movement was a combination of cultural pride and economic backwardness.
Explain.

Answer. The chapter presents the Assam Movement of 1979 to 1985 as
“the best example of such movements against ‘outsiders’”, and the two
halves of the statement are the two halves of the movement.

The cultural pride.

• Large scale migration into the North-East “gave rise to a special kind of problem that
  pitted the ‘local’ communities against people who were seen as
  ‘outsiders’ or migrants”.
• In Assam specifically, “The Assamese suspected that there were huge numbers of illegal
  Bengali Muslim settlers from Bangladesh. They felt that unless these foreign nationals are detected
  and deported they would reduce the indigenous Assamese into a minority.” The fear is not
  about jobs alone; it is about ceasing to be the majority in one’s own State.
• The movement was therefore directed “against illegal migrations, against domination of
  Bengalis and other outsiders, and against faulty voters’ register that included the names of
  lakhs of immigrants”, and it demanded that all outsiders who had entered the State
  after 1951 be sent back.
• That this fear was not abstract is shown by the chapter’s own example from a neighbouring
  State: the problem is “particularly acute, for example, in Tripura as the original
  inhabitants have been reduced to being a minority in their own land”.

The economic backwardness.

• “There were other economic issues too. There was widespread poverty and unemployment
  in Assam despite the existence of natural resources like oil, tea and coal. It was felt that these
  were drained out of the State without any commensurate benefit to the people.”
• The latecomers were also seen as “encroachers on scarce resources like land and
  potential competitors to employment opportunities and political power”, which is an
  economic grievance expressed in cultural terms.
• The movement’s own methods show the economic side plainly: it “tried to blockade
  the movement of trains and the supply of oil from Assam to refineries in Bihar”. That is
  an attack on exactly the resource flow the movement complained about.
• The wider context is the chapter’s own: the Partition of 1947 had reduced the North-East
  to a land locked region and affected its economy, and cut off from the rest of India
  “the region suffered neglect in developmental terms”.

How the two combined. Because it spoke to both fears at once, the movement led by the
All Assam Students’ Union, a students’ group not affiliated to any party,
“mobilised all sections of Assamese people, drawing support across the State”,
though it “also involved many tragic and violent incidents leading to loss of property and
human lives”. After six years of turmoil the Rajiv Gandhi-led government negotiated the
Assam accord of 1985, under which foreigners who migrated into Assam during and after the
Bangladesh war and since were to be identified and deported. The AASU and the Asom Gana Sangram
Parishad then organised themselves as the Asom Gana Parishad, which came to power in 1985
promising to resolve the foreign national problem “as well as to build a ‘Golden
Assam’”. That promise names both halves in one phrase.

End with the chapter’s own verdict: “Assam accord brought peace and changed
the face of politics in Assam, but it did not solve the problem of immigration.”

Q. All regional movements need not lead to separatist demands. Explain by giving examples
from this chapter.

Answer. The chapter gives several movements that were entirely regional in their demands
and never became separatist, and at least one that began as separatist and ended inside the Union.
Take them in that order.

1. Movements that were never separatist.

• The Dravidian movement. The clearest example. “Though some sections of this
  movement had ambitions of creating a Dravida nation, the movement did not take to arms. It used
  democratic means like public debates and the electoral platform to achieve its ends.” The
  strategy worked: the DMK came to power in 1967, Dravidian parties have dominated Tamil Nadu since,
  and from 1996 one of them has been part of the ruling coalition at the Centre. The chapter’s
  own conclusion is that “regional politics in Tamil Nadu is a good example of the
  compatibility of regionalism and nationalism”.
• The linguistic State movements. The agitations that shaped today’s Andhra Pradesh,
  Karnataka, Maharashtra and Gujarat asked for States within India, not outside it, and were met by
  “redrawing the internal boundaries of the country”.
• The ‘Punjabi suba’ movement. The Akali Dal’s demand for a Punjabi
  speaking State was met in 1966 with the creation of Punjab and Haryana.
• The autonomy demands inside Assam. The Bodos, Karbis and Dimasas wanted separate States
  within India. Since it was not possible to go on making smaller and yet smaller States, the demands
  were met with other federal provisions: “Karbis and Dimasas have been granted autonomy
  under District Councils while Bodos were recently granted Autonomous Council.”
• Goa. The dispute there was not about leaving India at all: it was about whether Goa
  should merge with Maharashtra or keep a separate identity and the Konkani language, and it was
  settled by an ‘opinion poll’ in January 1967.
• Sikkim. The movement there ran the opposite way: the assembly elected in 1974 asked for
  full integration with India, and Sikkim became the 22nd State of the Indian union.

2. A movement that began separatist and did not stay that way. Mizoram is the
chapter’s own proof that even a secessionist movement need not end in separation. The MNF
under Laldenga fought a two decade armed campaign from 1966, but “At the end of two decades
of insurgency everyone was a loser. This is where maturity of the political leadership at both ends
made a difference.” In 1986 a peace agreement was signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Laldenga:
Mizoram was granted full-fledged statehood with special powers, the MNF agreed to give up the
secessionist struggle, and Laldenga took over as Chief Minister. Today “Mizoram is one of
the most peaceful places in the region and has taken big strides in literacy and
development”.

3. Why this is so, in the chapter’s own explanation. The reason regional movements
need not turn separatist is that the Indian system is built to receive them. The nation
“shall not deny the rights of different regions and linguistic groups to retain their own
culture”; democracy “allows the political expressions of regional aspirations and
does not look upon them as anti-national”; and the federal system is a flexible
arrangement, with special provisions for some states and a Sixth Schedule allowing tribes complete
autonomy over their practices and customary laws. The closing sentence puts it directly:
“Therefore, regional aspirations are not encouraged to espouse separatism.”

The counter-example to acknowledge: Nagaland, where the movement started much
earlier, Phizo turned down many offers of negotiated settlement, and the problem
“still awaits a final resolution”. Mentioning it strengthens the answer, because
it shows that the outcome depends on whether negotiation is taken up, not on the demand’s
original form.

Q. Regional demands from different parts of India exemplify the principle of unity with
diversity. Do you agree? Give reasons.

Answer. This question asks for your own view, so state it and then give reasons from the
chapter. The model answer below agrees, which is the position the chapter’s own text
supports, and then notes the qualification the chapter itself adds.

Yes, and here is why.

• The principle is built into the Indian approach from the start. “the Indian
  nation shall not deny the rights of different regions and linguistic groups to retain their own
  culture. We decided to live a united social life without losing the distinctiveness of the numerous
  cultures that constituted it. Indian nationalism sought to balance the principles of unity and
  diversity. The nation would not mean the negation of the region.” That is unity with
  diversity stated as policy.
• Regional demands were met by changing the map, not by refusing them. Linguistic States
  were created; Punjab and Haryana came in 1966; Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand came later.
  “Thus the challenge of diversity was met by redrawing the internal boundaries of the
  country.” The country stayed one while its internal shape changed.
• Where a demand could not be met by a new State, the federal structure bent instead.
  District Councils for the Karbis and Dimasas, an Autonomous Council for the Bodos, the Sixth
  Schedule’s complete autonomy for tribes over their practices and customary laws, and special
  provisions for states like J&K and those in the North-East.
• Regionalism and nationalism turned out to be compatible in practice. Tamil Nadu is the
  chapter’s example: a movement “initially seen as a threat to Indian nationalism”
  became “a good example of the compatibility of regionalism and nationalism”, and
  since 1996 one of its parties has been part of the ruling coalition at the Centre.
• Even secession was answered by accommodation. Mizoram was granted full-fledged statehood
  with special powers in 1986 and is today one of the most peaceful places in the region.
• The chapter’s own summary sentence. “politics in India has succeeded in
  accepting regionalism as part and parcel of democratic politics.”

The qualification to add, because the chapter adds it. Unity with diversity is not
automatic; the chapter says “even after 75 years of independence, some of the issues of
national integration are not fully resolved”. Its own lessons name the conditions: regional
groups need a share in power at the State level and a share in deciding the destiny of the nation,
because “If regions are not given a share in the national level decision making, the feeling
of injustice and alienation can spread”; and regional imbalance in economic development
“contributes to the feeling of regional discrimination”. So regional demands
exemplify unity with diversity when they are negotiated rather than suppressed, and the
chapter’s comparison makes the point: the eighties saw militancy in Punjab, problems in the
North-East, agitation in Assam and the Kashmir valley on the boil, and it was the choice not to treat
these as simple law and order problems that produced reconciliation.

Q. Which unity is the poet talking about?

Answer. The poet is talking about two unities at once, and a full answer names
both.

• The unity of the North-East as a whole. The passage says the song “dwells on
  the unity theme; the seven states of north-eastern India become seven sisters born of the same
  mother”. Even as Meghalaya, Arunachal and Mizoram go their separate ways as States, they
  remain sisters of one mother, so political separation is not treated as the end of kinship. This
  matches the chapter’s own description of these States as “the seven sisters”.
• The unity of the Assamese with the smaller nationalities still inside Assam. The passage
  says the song ends “with a determination to keep the unity of the Assamese with other
  smaller nationalities that are left in the present-day Assam”, and names them:
  ‘the Karbis and the Missing brothers and sisters are our dear ones’. This is the
  more pointed of the two, because it answers from within the very movement that had been accused of
  turning against outsiders.

The link to make: this is unity with diversity in the poet’s own language. The unity
is not sameness; it survives the states going their own way, and it extends to the smaller
communities inside Assam rather than only to the Assamese.

Q. Why were some States of North-East created separately out of the erstwhile State of
Assam?

Answer. At independence “the entire region except Manipur and Tripura comprised
the State of Assam.” The separate States were created for the following reasons, which the
chapter gives in order.

1. Language. “Demands for political autonomy arose when the non-Assamese felt that
   the Assam government was imposing Assamese language on them.” There were opposition and
   protest riots throughout the State.
2. Tribal identity and the demand for a tribal State. Leaders of the major tribal
   communities wanted to separate from Assam. They formed the Eastern India Tribal Union, which
   later transformed into the more comprehensive All Party Hill Leaders Conference in 1960, and
   “demanded a tribal State to be carved out of Assam”.
3. The practical answer the Centre chose. “Finally instead of one tribal State,
   several States got carved out of Assam. At different points of time the Central Government had to
   create Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh out of Assam. Tripura and Manipur were upgraded
   into States too.” The reorganisation of the North-East was completed by 1972.

Add the dates if the question carries marks for them: Nagaland State was created in
1963; Manipur, Tripura and Meghalaya in 1972; Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh became
separate States in 1987. In the case of Mizoram, note that the chapter also says the
1986 accord granted it “full-fledged statehood with special powers”; both
years are printed in your book, so give the one the question asks for, or both with a word of
explanation.

The closing point. Making separate States was not the only method used. When the Bodos,
Karbis and Dimasas raised the same kind of demand later, “It was not possible to go on
making smaller and yet smaller States”, so District Councils and an Autonomous Council were
used instead.

Q. Do you think that the same theme of unity could apply to all the regions of India? Why?

Answer. This asks for your view. The model answer below says yes, with a condition,
and reasons entirely from the chapter.

Yes. The theme in the song is that separation into different States does not end the
kinship between them, and that the majority community owes the same kinship to the smaller
communities living alongside it. Both halves apply across India, on the chapter’s own
reasoning.

• The first half is the Indian approach itself: “The nation would not mean the negation
  of the region.” Punjab and Haryana were separated in 1966, and Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand
  and Jharkhand were carved out later, without any of them ceasing to belong to India.
• The second half is the chapter’s third lesson, about power sharing: it is not
  enough that regions have autonomy in their own matters, because “The regions together form
  the nation. So, the regions must have a share in deciding the destiny of the nation.”
• Tamil Nadu is the worked example. A movement once “seen as a threat to Indian
  nationalism” became “a good example of the compatibility of regionalism and
  nationalism”.

The condition. The chapter does not present this as automatic. It says that
“even after 75 years of independence, some of the issues of national integration are not
fully resolved”, and warns that if regions are not given a share in national level decision
making, “the feeling of injustice and alienation can spread”, and that regional
imbalance in economic development contributes to the feeling of regional discrimination. So the theme
of unity can apply everywhere, but only where regional aspirations are met by democratic
negotiation and power sharing rather than by suppression. That, the chapter concludes, is what
makes India’s constitutional framework “much more flexible and
accommodative” than that of many other countries facing the same challenge.

Q. Does it mean that regionalism is not as dangerous as communalism? Or may be, not dangerous at all?

Answer. The chapter’s answer is that regionalism is not dangerous in itself, because India adopted a democratic approach to diversity: democracy “allows the political expressions of regional aspirations and does not look upon them as anti-national”, and the nation “would not mean the negation of the region”. Regional aspirations can be accommodated by redrawing State boundaries, by autonomy and by power sharing, as Tamil Nadu shows, where regional politics became “a good example of the compatibility of regionalism and nationalism”. But the chapter does not say it is never dangerous: “a concern for region alone may blind us to the larger needs of the nation”, and in the 1980s some regional movements turned to armed assertion and demands for separation. So regionalism becomes dangerous only when it turns separatist or violent; expressed democratically, it is a normal part of politics. (This is a discussion question; give reasons for your view.)

Q. Why does the challenge always come from the border States?

Answer. Not always, since the chapter’s own list includes linguistic agitations in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Gujarat and the creation of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, which are not border States. But the most serious challenges, in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East, did come from border regions, and the chapter gives the reasons. Border States have an external dimension: Pakistan sponsored the tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947 and gave moral, material and military support to the insurgents, and the MNF got support from the Pakistani government and shelter in the then East Pakistan. Border regions were also hit hardest by Partition: it reduced the North-East to a land locked region, cut it off from the rest of India and left it neglected in developmental terms, and the vast international border and weak communication with the rest of India “added to the delicate nature of politics there”. Border States also receive large scale migration from neighbouring countries, which produced movements against ‘outsiders’ such as the Assam Movement.

Q. This is all about governments, officials, leaders, terrorists… but what about the people in Jammu and Kashmir? In a democracy we must go by what they want, shouldn’t we?

Answer. Yes, and the chapter shows what happened when the people’s wishes were set aside. The confidence that Kashmiris had developed in democratic processes after the 1974 accord received a setback when Farooq Abdullah’s government was dismissed through the Centre’s intervention; the 1987 election was widely believed to have been rigged; and popular resentment against an inefficient administration and the feeling that democratic processes were being undermined at the behest of the Centre produced a political crisis that became severe with the rise of insurgency. One of the grievances the chapter records is exactly this, that democracy as practised in the rest of India had not been similarly institutionalised in the State. The chapter’s lessons point the same way: regional aspirations are best met through democratic negotiation and power sharing rather than suppression. Going by what the people want also means listening to all of them, since Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh have different aspirations, and the chapter notes that the 2014 election recorded the highest voters’ turnout in 25 years. (Give your view with reasons.)